Does it Make Any Sense to Talk of Feminism in an Islamic Context?
[Written by Connor for a philosophy Masters]
Since the global advances of Feminism, many have pointed out its seemingly stark contrast against the perceived values of Islam. Alongside liberal democracy, LGBT rights and many other “Western” motifs, Islam is often regarded as presenting something of a culture clash. Indeed, many have argued that following the Cold War, particularly in the wake of 9/11, we have been offered a prevailing narrative of Islam as a cultural opposition to Western life.[1] This idea of a ‘civilizational conflict’ is a ‘growing concern’ for ‘Muslims and non-Muslims alike’.[2] The existence of hijab (particularly full-veiled burkhas), segregated prayers, polygamy, arranged marriages and many other examples across Muslim communities seem to lend to this idea that Islam, in a wider sense, is intrinsically at odds with the ideals of Feminism and female empowerment. Alongside certain scriptural, sociological and historical examples this may seem, at first glance an irreconcilable situation. Yet others; Islamic Feminists among them, contest this case with various sociological nuances and Qur’anic readings. Such voices even go as far as to advocate that Islam is in fact, inherently Feministic, having a relevant and meaningful voice in the wider debate on Feminism.
The issue of answering how much sense Feminism can truly make against the backdrop of Islam, requires us to conceptualise both Feminism and Islam, and what we, and others might mean in using them. An argument can be made that poor discussion of these ideas is what has confused the debate. Once in established and relatively workable definitions we can begin to see why these positions of both irreconcilability and compatibility are formed. Defining these terms and investigating the values of Feminism can often clarify how this polarised plethora of understanding arises, making this a broad and loaded question.[3] It is in a misinformed and often suppositious account of Islamic religiosity (predominantly within Western discourse) that presents an overly politicised and oppressive side of the religion, as a monolithic, heteronomous narrative no less.[4] Yet it is also this broad commentary, under the wing of liberal-left milieus which sweeps any claim of misogyny or patriarchy under the convenient carpet of racism, no matter from whom they come.[5] Furthermore, it is through an ill-defined and abstractly practiced account of Feminism that we encounter further issues. Feminists have often ignored ethics and existentialism in the conversation on religion, and in doing so, have equated any exercise of choice in any context with empowerment. Vehement apologists for Islamic Feminism have left the conversation dried of meaning and, (thanks to this firmly planted flag of a very specific kind of “autonomy”), devoid of honest critical discussion. Truly evaluating Islam requires us to look between these extremes and examine a refined understanding of Feminism, bolstered by the philosophical tradition.
Ultimately, we are faced with a religion with numerous inspirational examples of emancipation, autonomy, leadership and importance from women. A religion that unmistakably has ‘both negative and positive attitudes to women’ and that clearly countless women are attracted to, even in contemporary times as they have become more readily visible, self-determined and important in the wider world.[6] Some of these examples are somewhat strongly Feministic. Many however, are against certain thematic backdrops; a subsidiary meaning to the divine, submission, anonymity, humility and a loaded context in which the practice of choice operates. This issue of religious Feminism is one that extends to all religions, particularly against more orthodox milieus.[7] There is clearly a perceived trend of monotheistic religion as ‘anti-woman’.[8] Jeffrey’s notes the misogynistic ideologies which promote a ‘subordinate nature’, ‘modesty’ and ‘naturally separate roles’.[9] Although theoretically far from the barbed caricature of an unforgiving misogyny, we are faced with an ideology that offers poor conceptual approaches to ideas surrounding empowerment and a patriarchal social and theological reality. One way we can navigate this is to explore existing Islamic themes of the feminine and offer up greater revisions of ideas like autonomy and empowerment.
We might find that the word Feminism is unhelpful here, mainly due to a problem with loaded Western discourse concerning Feminism. After all, many have commented on the movement’s loaded theoretical divisions and ‘unavoidably convoluted’ arguments.[10] This lack of clarity owes itself to various factors including an increasingly ‘great internal diversity’.[11] In order to utilise this concept of Feminism into our question we must conceptualise the convoluted movement into a more workable definition before we can juxtapose it to various forms of Islamic religiosity. After all, we are also faced with the idea of projecting Western discourse onto a wholly different discourse and making sense in this way whilst avoiding a kind of nonsensical orientalism, or ‘projection’ of will.[12] A more useful and revised notion is perhaps the idea of “empowerment” which seems to encapsulate a broad impression of Feminism holistically, while giving us something grounded and workable. Here we have ‘the manifestation and redistribution of power’ to that of equilibrium.[13]
Yet we might wish to identify a difference between political Feminism which simply seeks a distribution of legal power, and existential Feminism which extends this to social, cultural and spiritual notions; asking “what is power and the powerful?” One thing we might identify is that earlier waves of Feminism focused on political autonomy and the exercise of choice in a more objective, legal and systemic context, while later manifestations began to revise what power meant applied in an experiential context. Exploring power relations against the backdrop of novel understandings of plurality of expression and lifestyles, dispelling stereotypes, loaded language, cultural assumptions about women is also integral to this movement. This subsequently aids in a deeper engagement with ideas of objectification. These assist in redefining the core basis of Feminism - flourishing; the idea of the empowered woman is contentious, informed and successful, contending with men in every corner of the field, or able to be so without stigma or surprise. Subsequently, this lends to cultural discussion of role models. Natasha Walters presents such a Feminism in her work Living Dolls, abandoning explicitly political discussion and turning the focus to broader societal issues. She identifies a ‘frightening picture of the personal’ whereby ‘discrimination and inequality are dismissed’ and concealed by naturalistic arguments.[14] So, as well as legal freedom we might wish to explore this more existential notion of empowerment and all it entails, which is much less clearly defined and philosophically interesting to thematically contrast against Islam.
There must also be a framework for understanding what Islam is, namely this must include scripture but also extend beyond it as this text cannot stand in a vacuum. This is made hard by an absolute lack of consensus (like most other extant religions).[15] We also have another problem – what is an Islamic utopia, has such a thing ever existed? Even in the time of the prophet? This question is beset by almost nonnavigational controversy in itself, yet alone on the specific question of women.[16] That said, it seems to make no sense to ignore scripture – to make sense of the term Muslim we must accept that they follow the Islamic scripture in some sense. As such, scripture is perhaps the best place to begin investigating the presence of (or lack of) this idea of empowerment within Islam, establishing a context for these ideas. There is a general claim among Feminists that much of the alleged misogyny of the religion is largely cultural, social or political and has little to no basis in actual theology, contrary to popular belief. Despite this, as many have still pointed out, there are some difficult passages concerning women. Alongside this we have problems with the Hadith, or sayings of the prophet, etc.[17] Among these difficult passages are Sura 4:34 which invites men to ‘hit’ their wives. From such grounds, it would appear that we already have an impasse between the two ideas, yet there are theological readings (alongside a great many historical examples and contemporary writings) that rise to counter this view.[18]
Revisionists overcome the problems encountered in these passages by arguing for varying degrees of interpretive theology; usually reframing existing cultural misogyny as ultimately superficial or ungrounded. This is a view espoused by writers like Fatima Mernissi, who advocate a more inherently liberal reading of theology. Perhaps less controversial than a holistically liberal Qur’an (but not without issues), is the idea of patriarchal erroneous entries to the Hadith.[19] Mernissi engages with the veracity of patriarchal ideas presented in the Hadith. From an insider perspective, she notes how popular opinion rejects the idea of women in positions of authority.[20] She recognises the Hadith as not only an exceptionally authoritative text but also a source of misogynistic oppression. She regards it as incongruent to true Islamic reformism and emancipatory efforts in the time of Muhammed, having derailed the egalitarian themes of the religion. In particular, she comments on Abu Bakr’s recollection of the words of the prophet in saying “those who entrust their affairs to a woman will never know prosperity”. This, she claims, is an all too convenient recollection that would require ‘a fabulous memory’.[21] When given Bakr’s personal history of conviction, she argues this amounts to little more than opportunism.[22] As such, she regards the Hadith and other spurious cultural constructions as responsible for much of the perceived intrinsic patriarchy of Islam.
Others, like Amina Wadud, also in defence of Islam, argue for a revised accommodating interpretation of the Qur’an itself. Wadud seems not be able to get around this difficult mention of ‘hitting’. So still there are some Suras that are incredibly and controversially difficult. Indeed, unlike the Hadith, the Qur’an is of purportedly divine origins. As such this approach is subjected to thematic dilution or narrowing. Despite this, Wadud argues that ‘we are the makers of textual meaning’.[23] This may go some way into providing a framework for a revised understanding of women in Islam but can only go so far against more obstinate verses as such readings must have sensitivity to the source; meaning-making must be grounded and consistent. Wadud herself says that this conversation on meaning cannot transcend core principles.[24] So, in light of this it seems one way of reconciling empowerment with Islam is to narrow our view of the religion to encompass a more specific theology and even a more liberal and looser reading of the Qur’an.[25] Though far beyond the barbed and clumsy narrative of an intrinsically and unwaveringly oppressive scripture, we can still see some particularly irreconcilable issues with Islamic scripture and difficult concepts. What we are essentially presented by these revisionist is an appeal to ‘equal footing’ at best, but even this has its problems. Sharma and Young contest that ‘The Qur’an shows no discrimination against women’ yet as the ‘home is a microcosm of the ummah and world community’ we find this positivity narrowly framed.[26] As we shall also see from historical and cultural examples this does not necessarily amount to more considered notions of “empowerment”, only a contextually relative and explicitly religious relative empowerment.
Beyond scripture, we have various historical examples of empowered females in Islam. Among these are Khalifa, Nafisa who recited the Qur’an six thousand times and A’isha whose symbolism, personal connection to the prophet and religious importance are renowned within Islam. A’isha, Muhammed’s later wife also spoke out against certain instances of veiling.[27] Muhammed is even reported to have said ‘take half of your religion from this one’ with regards to A’isha.[28] Khadija, Muhammed’s first wife and mentor is also another prominent example, often invoked.[29] Historian Karen Armstrong references instances such as the prophet ’allowing’ his wives to ‘answer him back’.[30] So not only are these examples (at least partially) progressive but we also see some endorsement of them due to their presence in scripture. Not to mention these examples existing within the relative clarity and conceptual purity of the beginnings of Islam; historically prior to theological controversies and sectarian divisions.
On a more general note, Jean Holm and John Baker, in their work Women In Religion, identify a broad theme of emancipation whereby women were given ‘enhanced status’ under early Islam.[31] Armstrong notes that many women who were attracted to Muhammed’s religion, inclined to ideas of tradition, transcendence, community and modesty.[32] We should also note that she remarks how, even in this time, it was commonplace for women to be used as bargaining chips and constantly threatened with the insecurity of divorce.[33] Margaret Smith identifies that, although pre-Islamic women were considerably ‘more free’ than in later years beyond the Islamic conquests, these restrictions were of a social and legal nature introduced with little to no spiritual essence.[34] These ‘free Beodu women’ were characterised by independence, personal wealth, access to learning and skills and even choice of marriage (and in some cases outright and long-lasting refusal altogether).[35] Indeed, Smith even argues that a kind of chivalry, whereupon women not only exercised their own power, but men catered to it, characterised pre-Islamic society.[36] One could argue that Muhammed also brought about similar kind of chivalry through providing security to women. Chivalry however, like many of these themes, is a difficult notion to reconcile with the empowerment of women, given its arguably patronising views of the feminine under a narrative of gifted protection over support.[37] Though contextually beneficial to an Arabia of the Middle Ages, such a framing which characterises the female with fragility, dependent and relational to men is clearly not an ideal theme to remain unaltered. Modern advocates of Feminism, moving beyond basic legal equality, have noted that even contemporary embodiments of such notions have ‘patronising and condescending attitudes’, with implications of obligatory domestication of women; even correlations with ‘hostile sexism and social dominance orientation’.[38]
These proto-egalitarian motifs from a Pre-Islamic Arabia fed into early Islam. We see this continuity not only in previously mentioned singular examples but general ones such as women fighting alongside the prophet, the idea of an egalitarian household and full access to prayer.[39] Smith continues to argue that whilst Muhammed’s laws generally attempted to emancipate women and secure their safety, these freedoms were in fact later taken away as new traditions became established.[40] Much of this later loss of rights she attributes to a borrowed misogyny from Byzantium and Christendom, particularly the heavy use of the veil, hijacked under the condescending narrative of “protection”.[41]
Yet despite these historical misogynistic introductions, Smith identifies several examples of empowerment within Islam still, focusing heavily upon traditions of Sufi mysticism that continued after these restrictive cultural motifs took hold.[42] Rabia of Basra is held in high regard for her miracles, teachings and writings.[43] As well as Indian Princess, Fatimah, a famous renunciant as examples of autonomy.[44] We might be tempted to look for this elusive total reconciliation in the experiential, the personal and the spiritual in contrast to within heteronomy and orthodoxy.[45] The questions are, whether this mystical element or law is central to Islam (a complex matter of orthodoxy) and whether even this mystical element is truly empowering on a personal level. Islamic society can certainly accommodate female power as a matter of historical fact and there are scriptural grounds on which this is done. This motif of spiritual and even political power can be seen to continue into modernity with prominent Muslims in power such as Baroness Warsi and perhaps one of the stronger examples being the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Bennett notes a contradistinction between Muslim countries having female heads of state where other developed countries have yet to do so.[46] Yet it is probably best we investigate what is happening thematically rather than simply continuing to list empowered females in Islamic history.
Given Sufism’s prominence it seems odd to reject this as a valid form of Islam but we also must contend with more Orthodox forms and legalistic and authoritative sources beyond the Qur’an like the Sunnah and Shariah. Simply ignoring these is theologically difficult. Themes of ‘obedience’, nature denial, subjugation/worship and harsh renunciation still crucially appear in the mystical traditions, albeit are individualistic and self-imposed.[47] This heavily contrasts to feminist existential philosophers like Simone de Beauvoir, who advocates ‘we are totally and inexcusably responsible for our actions’ in a godless world. [48] In this way, non-reliance sheds power relations in the religious sense and thus the accountability to external power. Bergoffen writes on this position, illustrating that ‘some of us evade the responsibilities of freedom by choosing to remain children, that is, to submit to the authority of others’, ‘Looking to return to the security of that metaphysically privileged time’.[49] As a Feminist, de Beauvoir would reject even mysticisms’ power relation.
Other Abrahamic religions perhaps display more thematic denial of women in nature. That is, many religions seem to deny or demonise natural processes such as sex, childbirth, menstruation; demonising the natural instincts as sins that put us at risk of damnation.[50] At the very least they are denoted in their worth as relational to divinity. This is something Holm and Baker note in contrasting Islam and Judeo-Christianity in their views on the feminine.[51] They advocate that the latter is more prescriptive and damning compared to Islam’s idea of giving birth as a witness as opposed to a punishment and that motherhood is seen as a respected honour than a lower task.[52] Whilst other aspects of biology (menstruation, childbirth and sex for example) are apparently not intrinsically unholy but do require the ritualised purification of ghul.[53] Despite these comparative nuances we still seem to miss the notion of sufficient goods and seem to have a domestic framing of femininity in a kind of divinely sanctioned naturalism. That is, the idea of duty, judgement and assumption are still not dispelled and this does not bode well for a view of power relations. We should be suspicious of this ‘separate but equal’ (often private) notion as separation seems to suggest prescriptive or fixed roles for women, rejecting plurality and choice.[54] Given that these examples are commonly quoted by Feminists, it seems often that some apologists seek celebration for awarding the most basic of rights and spiritual equalities to women.
There are of course, many obvious examples of interpretations of Islam that are incommensurably, even earnestly so, in stark opposition to ideas like empowerment. Certain traditionalists and heavily conservative Islam would clearly say these concepts cannot be reconciled and should not be. This is largely a definitional opposition and depends heavily upon how one sees the importance of the Hadith or the nature of the religion.[55] Other Feminists, such as Susan Carter in her work Hislam, have adopted a more widely critical reading of Islamic theology. Ex-Islamic Feminists often make the same claims as these traditionalists and Feminists, highlighting the problem of utter incommensurability with the virtues of Feminism and Islam. It should be noted that though their voice lends something invaluable to the discussion (having come from the religion) it is somewhat stunted by its utter dilution and essentially being a different position. Ayaan Hirsi Ali exemplifies this in her presence amongst the New Atheist Milieu, arguing Islam to be intrinsically misogynistic.[56] In Ayaan’s view, Islam must undergo a sudden radical renewal of liberal introspective theology to save it from violence and to bring it in line with modern thinking. [57] Though this goes some way to establish a view of non-feminist culture this is exceptionally barbed and critical and a difficult theological position, as we shall see.
The issue is whether any of these examples, even in their best light, are equivocal to true empowerment, as opposed to simply a sense of wider meaning and identity. We are forced to contend with questions such as “Is separate but equal still equal?”[58] “Is the exercise of choice to submit still an example of empowerment? Does it even make sense to talk of Islamic ‘rights’ as opposed to ‘duties’ in the religion of submission? If it does, what are the rights of women in Islam compared with that of men?”.[59] A relatively lighthearted video produced by the BBC, attempts to address these questions and challenges claims of the burkha being anti-Feminist. Utilising personal insider testimony, it delves into some of these issues to counter a “misconception” of oppression. In contrast to an outright patriarchy, the women mention concepts such as consent, cosmic meaning, modesty and the fact they are ‘a minority within a minority’ and that some women must ‘fight to wear it’. [60] Yet these questions are clearly more difficult. A choice to surrender power and meaning to an external force denies notions of sufficient and intrinsic good which might make us wonder, what is celebrated or good about the actual women themselves? Surely not any consensual life choice or religious affiliation is a good one. It is probably useful to clarify a difference here between willfully deferring power in a sense of ‘modesty’ and actually being empowered.[61] When we look to the wider commentary on religion we find ideas that are difficult to reconcile with empowerment. Though specifically speaking of Christianity, Nietzsche for example argues, ‘faith has meant a sacrifice: the sacrifice of freedom, pride, spiritual self-confidence; it has meant subjugation and self-derision, self-mutilation’.[62] Nietzsche talks also of ‘self-denial’ and ‘sacrifizio dell’intelletto’ (denial of the intellect).[63]
What the framing of this conversation also fails to understand is that between obligation and freedom there is a broad spectrum of loaded choice. It is the decisions that occupy this place that modern Feminism in the Western world tasks itself with engaging with; can a woman be a Feminist nude model for instance? In many cases, this would be an exercise of choice, yet there is a whole unexplored language of conformity, social themes and existentialism. Ultimately this is delving into deeper questions of what truly empowered feminine flourishing might look like, something that Walter does in her exploration of exploitive nightclub culture against the backdrop of ‘choice’, a word that is used frequently in these hypersexualized settings.[64] Yet despite the practice of choice, these women are still objectified, reduced to aesthetic pleasure and denied their holistic subject, and not always in the way intended.[65] It is exactly this honest critical engagement which seems swept aside in discussion of religious empowerment.
We encounter several problems when we hit on this strange and clumsy assumption that Islam is no more inherently misogynistic than Christianity and Judaism, but simply needs to “catch up like they have”, as they are ‘500 years behind’.[66] Namely, this assumes a notion of linear progression that simply does not exist as such commentators would like to imagine. Moreover, though there is evidently some room for theological revision, we are ultimately presented with a fundamentally different theology; one that is more robust and rigid. Imagining certain moves within this space often lead to the awkward question of dilution and ahistorical inappropriateness.[67] In any case, empowerment is no less necessarily absent from this religion than many of its counterparts and for it to ideationally and persuasively take hold this would, should and could not require some bizarre parody of a “protestant reformation”. The idea of reformation already exists within Islam, firmly rooted as an idea of constant revision and renewal.[68] Ultimately, this is a theologically insensitive view of religion which projects an alien agenda and an incompatible discourse.[69] That isn’t to say that certain interpretations don’t vehemently try to reconcile more liberal ideas with theology, as we have seen. And of course, largely this lack of correlation is not the stark and blunt contrast as imagined by tabloid newspapers but with deeper subtleties, nuances and a wide spectrum of observance. What we are questioning is the meaningful sense this makes, both conceptually and practically.
If we were to argue that Islam is compatible with Feminism we would have to do so with many caveats; namely refining our definitions of both terms, arguably stretching them beyond what is ideationally, linguistically and pragmatically useful or recognisable. On one hand, we are faced with a discourse with some “Feministic” nuances, inspiring historical examples, contextual improvements for women and a theological or spiritual intention to somewhat provide egalitarianism and fulfilment.[70] Conversely, this Islamic Feminism is ultimately limited in its general meaning and feminism is, for a myriad of reasons, not the most sensical of words to deploy in many Islamic contexts. Even the most apologetic Islamic Feminists must contend with an overwhelming cultural patriarchy, rooted in understanding of theology as well as politics and therefore must contend with misogynists on theological grounds. We might be tempted of course, to say that this theology is largely ungrounded in scripture. Yet, even in this optimistically positive context this reduces our notion of a Feministic Islam to explicitly critical revisionist interpretations or purely mystical traditions, denying all others.[71] Such narrow notions thus deny the legitimacy of the social element of religion, reducing true Islam to the almost purely theoretical.
Aside from defining Islam, we have an issue of defining Feminism. If we accept our philosophical definition involving autonomy and equality we begin to enquire whether religiosity in a general sense is reconcilable with these notions.[72] Again, this is not entirely incommensurable as many religious Feminists have argued, yet still requires a plethora of caveats to engage with these difficult questions. In taking this idea of Feminism away from its basic notion of simply ‘equal rights’ we might wish to say that, while early Islam supports the latter it is slower to respond to the former. That is, a political, economic and nominally spiritual equality is one thing and a great progressive step relative to its time. Yet without examining the principles behind these we are left with a potentially outdated notion of the feminine (rejecting its plurality), narrow ideas of empowerment and as a result, poor cultural footing.[73] We also seem to be implying that Islam can and should want this incommensurable discourse for itself, but under a discourse of self-discipline, the idea of empowerment seems ultimately misplaced. Though it should go without saying that this is not a problem unique to Islam and one that all religions contend with. Despite efforts and nuances, these are irreconcilable languages and are intended to be as such; the notions that religions can and should “catch up” is almost nonsensical. Such a combination of discourse is incredibly difficult, if not meaningless to achieve, conceptually and practically, depending on how far we think we can stretch our definitions. The shallower our empowerment and controversially diluted our religion gets in its rejection of sources and culture, the easier this becomes. Arguably, true Feministic empowerment is best found elsewhere.
[1] Joe L. Kincheloe, Shirley R. Steinberg, Christopher Darius Stonebanks, Teaching Against Islamophobia (Bern: Peter Lang, 2010) p. 13
[2] Roy Jackson in Interview with Dr Georgina Jardim: Women’s Rights In Islam, University of Gloucestershire, https://moodle.glos.ac.uk/moodle/mod/page/view.php?id=319716&inpopup=1 [Accessed 7 November 2017] (00:00-00:12)
[3] With the presence of Islamic Feminists, Islamic misogynists and anti-Islamic Feminists among the contributors.
[4] Raymond Taras, Xenophobia and Islamophobia in Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012) p. 86
[5] Tauriq Moosa, Big Think, To Criticise Islam, 2016 http://bigthink.com/against-the-new-taboo/to-criticise-islam [Accessed 2 December 2017]
[6] Arvid Sharma and Katherine K. Young, Feminism and World Religions (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999) p. 275
[7] Kristin Aune, Why Feminists Are Less Religious, The Guardian, 29 March 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2011/mar/29/why-Feminists-less-religious-survey [Accessed 22 November 2017]
A fact that we must face is whether any religion, yet alone one with obvious problems (as any Muslims would most likely point out).
[8] Sheila Jeffreys, Man's Dominion: The Rise of Religion and the Eclipse of Women's Rights (London: Routledge, 2013) p. 1943
[9] Ibid. p. 1947
[10] Madeleine Grumet in Lynda Stone, Gail Masuchika Boldt, The Education Feminism Reader (London: Psychology Press, 1994) p. 149
[11] Susan James in Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy, The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) p. 493
[12] Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2014) p. 95
[13] Chandra in Sushama Sahay, Women and Empowerment: Approaches and Strategies (New Delhi: Discovery Publishing House, 1998) p. 18
[14] Jessica Valenti, The Guardian, Living Dolls: The Return of Sexism by Natasha Walter, 31st January 2010 https://www.theguardian.com/books/2010/jan/31/living-dolls-natasha-walter [Accessed 01 December 2017]
[15] Roy Jackson in Interview with Dr Georgina Jardim (1:00-1:17)
[16] Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Concept of an Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan (London: Frances Pinter, 1987) p. 143
[17] We should be mindful that the Sunni tradition of Islam dominates most of its history. As such, (while attempting to avoid heteronomous narratives), we must understand much of the theology and thought explored here to be largely against the backdrop of this broad interpretation.
[18] Jardim in Interview with Dr Georgina Jardim: Women’s Rights In Islam (2:50-3:36)
[19] Namely that, despite certain conditional requirements to ensure the validity of the text, there are many contested and spurious entries within
[20] Mernissi, Fatima, A Feminist Interpretation of Women's Rights in Islam, Kurzman, C, (1998) Liberal Islam: a sourcebook, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 112-113
[21] Mernissi, F, ‘The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women’s Rights in Islam’ (1991) p. 115
‘Kurzman, C. Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook, (New York: OUP USA, 1998) pp.112-126
[22] Consequently, such additions are not sound (sahih) within its own theological rules.
[23] Amina Wadud, Qur'an and Woman: Re-Reading the Sacred Text from a Woman's Perspective, (New York: OUP USA, 1999) p. 203
[24] Ibid.
[25] Though this navigation of meaning is ultimately true it still has limitations with certain conceptual problems, namely the issue of conceptual dilution.
[26] ‘If seen through a non-patriarchal lens’ and ignoring other explicitly discriminatory texts and restricting positivity to “domestic duties”.
Sharman and Young, Feminism and World Religions, p. 275
[27] Margaret Smith, Muslim Women Mystics (Oxford: Oneworld, 2001) p. 150
[28] Holm and Baker, Women In Religion p. 88-89
[29] Jean Holm and John Baker, Women In Religion (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1994) p. 86
[30] Karen Armstrong, Islam: A Short History (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2000) p. 14
[31] Holm and Baker, Women In Religion p. xii
[32] Armstrong, Islam: A Short History p. 144 & p. 4
[33] Ibid. p. 15
[34] Smith p. 141-142 and p. 164
[35] Ibid. p. 148
[36] Ibid. p. 142
[37] Runjhun Noopur, Huffington Post, Chivalry Isn’t What You Think It Is! A Woman Explains, 28 April 2017 https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/chivalry-isnt-what-you-think-it-is-woman-splaining_us_59036faae4b084f59b49f88a [Accessed 8 December 2017]
[38] Kristin J. Anderson, Modern Misogyny: Anti-Feminism in a Post-Feminist Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) p. 63
[39] Smith p. 150, 152 and 153-4
[40] Ibid. p. 155-156
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid. p. 232
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] After all, these more individualistic forms of Islam at least avoid the idea of cultural oppression and patriarchal restrictions in a more overt way. Potentially, in this way they are compatible with Feminism, though often not entirely detached from the male will.
[46] Clinton Bennett, Muslim Women of Power: Gender, Politics and Culture in Islam (London: A&C Black, 2010) p. 36
[47] Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1981) p. 100
[48] Debra Bergoffen, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Simone de Beauvoir, 2014, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/beauvoir/ [Accessed 21 October 2017]
[49] Ibid.
This question of power thus relates to moral and authoritative power.
[50] Julian Young, Friedrich Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) p. 512
[51] Holm and Baker, Women In Religion p. 86-87
[52] Ibid. p. 88
[53] Ibid. p. 87
[54] Ibid. p. xiii
[55] Jardim in Interview with Dr Georgina Jardim (06:43-7:00)
[56] Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Heretic: Why Islam Needs a Reformation now (New York: Harper Collins, 2015) p. 28
[57] Ibid. p. 12
[58] As we have discussed this separation frames an immutable difference and thus a restrictive role.
[59] As with most religions, duties is perhaps a more apt word.
[60] BBC Three, Things Not To Say To Someone Who Wears a Burqa, Facebook, 21 October 2017, https://www.facebook.com/bbcthree/videos/10155232557455787/ [Accessed 22 October 2017]
[61] Modesty is another term that warrants examination. Modesty as opposed to what, for instance? How and why is veiling exactly a practice of modesty? This seems to frame nature and natural femininity in a very pessimistic manner.
[62] Fredrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2002) p. 44
[63] Ibid. p. 121
[64] Natasha Walter, Living Dolls: The Return of Sexism (Milton: Hachette UK, 2011) p. 3
[65] This is veritably a more subjective conversation, but by no means a subsequently invalid or meaningless one.
[66] Andrew B. R. Elliott, Medievalism, Politics and Mass Media: Appropriating the Middle Ages in the Twenty-First Century (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2017) p. 100
[67] Mehdi Hasan, Why Islam Doesn’t Need a Reformation, 17 May 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/17/islam-reformation-extremism-muslim-martin-luther-europe {Accessed 10 November 2017]
[68] Michelle Browers and Charles Kurzman, An Islamic Reformation? (Lanham, Lexington Books, 2004) p. 28
[69] There is only so far a stick can bend and this depends on both the thickness of the stick (level of orthodoxy) and type of wood (the religion).
[70] This scriptural, almost theoretical “proto-Feminism” is no less clearly defined than in many other religions.
[71] Not to mention that this notion of a clean theological/cultural split is somewhat inaccurate.
[72] Indeed, these ideas arguably go beyond gender and hit on broader concepts of flourishing, virtue and fulfilment; a harder strain of thought for religion still (yet probably too far from our original question to weigh in significantly).
[73] The notions of empowerment and the feminine we have explored offer themselves in a narrow context, rejecting diversity and restricting expression to a series of roles or duties.
The issue of answering how much sense Feminism can truly make against the backdrop of Islam, requires us to conceptualise both Feminism and Islam, and what we, and others might mean in using them. An argument can be made that poor discussion of these ideas is what has confused the debate. Once in established and relatively workable definitions we can begin to see why these positions of both irreconcilability and compatibility are formed. Defining these terms and investigating the values of Feminism can often clarify how this polarised plethora of understanding arises, making this a broad and loaded question.[3] It is in a misinformed and often suppositious account of Islamic religiosity (predominantly within Western discourse) that presents an overly politicised and oppressive side of the religion, as a monolithic, heteronomous narrative no less.[4] Yet it is also this broad commentary, under the wing of liberal-left milieus which sweeps any claim of misogyny or patriarchy under the convenient carpet of racism, no matter from whom they come.[5] Furthermore, it is through an ill-defined and abstractly practiced account of Feminism that we encounter further issues. Feminists have often ignored ethics and existentialism in the conversation on religion, and in doing so, have equated any exercise of choice in any context with empowerment. Vehement apologists for Islamic Feminism have left the conversation dried of meaning and, (thanks to this firmly planted flag of a very specific kind of “autonomy”), devoid of honest critical discussion. Truly evaluating Islam requires us to look between these extremes and examine a refined understanding of Feminism, bolstered by the philosophical tradition.
Ultimately, we are faced with a religion with numerous inspirational examples of emancipation, autonomy, leadership and importance from women. A religion that unmistakably has ‘both negative and positive attitudes to women’ and that clearly countless women are attracted to, even in contemporary times as they have become more readily visible, self-determined and important in the wider world.[6] Some of these examples are somewhat strongly Feministic. Many however, are against certain thematic backdrops; a subsidiary meaning to the divine, submission, anonymity, humility and a loaded context in which the practice of choice operates. This issue of religious Feminism is one that extends to all religions, particularly against more orthodox milieus.[7] There is clearly a perceived trend of monotheistic religion as ‘anti-woman’.[8] Jeffrey’s notes the misogynistic ideologies which promote a ‘subordinate nature’, ‘modesty’ and ‘naturally separate roles’.[9] Although theoretically far from the barbed caricature of an unforgiving misogyny, we are faced with an ideology that offers poor conceptual approaches to ideas surrounding empowerment and a patriarchal social and theological reality. One way we can navigate this is to explore existing Islamic themes of the feminine and offer up greater revisions of ideas like autonomy and empowerment.
We might find that the word Feminism is unhelpful here, mainly due to a problem with loaded Western discourse concerning Feminism. After all, many have commented on the movement’s loaded theoretical divisions and ‘unavoidably convoluted’ arguments.[10] This lack of clarity owes itself to various factors including an increasingly ‘great internal diversity’.[11] In order to utilise this concept of Feminism into our question we must conceptualise the convoluted movement into a more workable definition before we can juxtapose it to various forms of Islamic religiosity. After all, we are also faced with the idea of projecting Western discourse onto a wholly different discourse and making sense in this way whilst avoiding a kind of nonsensical orientalism, or ‘projection’ of will.[12] A more useful and revised notion is perhaps the idea of “empowerment” which seems to encapsulate a broad impression of Feminism holistically, while giving us something grounded and workable. Here we have ‘the manifestation and redistribution of power’ to that of equilibrium.[13]
Yet we might wish to identify a difference between political Feminism which simply seeks a distribution of legal power, and existential Feminism which extends this to social, cultural and spiritual notions; asking “what is power and the powerful?” One thing we might identify is that earlier waves of Feminism focused on political autonomy and the exercise of choice in a more objective, legal and systemic context, while later manifestations began to revise what power meant applied in an experiential context. Exploring power relations against the backdrop of novel understandings of plurality of expression and lifestyles, dispelling stereotypes, loaded language, cultural assumptions about women is also integral to this movement. This subsequently aids in a deeper engagement with ideas of objectification. These assist in redefining the core basis of Feminism - flourishing; the idea of the empowered woman is contentious, informed and successful, contending with men in every corner of the field, or able to be so without stigma or surprise. Subsequently, this lends to cultural discussion of role models. Natasha Walters presents such a Feminism in her work Living Dolls, abandoning explicitly political discussion and turning the focus to broader societal issues. She identifies a ‘frightening picture of the personal’ whereby ‘discrimination and inequality are dismissed’ and concealed by naturalistic arguments.[14] So, as well as legal freedom we might wish to explore this more existential notion of empowerment and all it entails, which is much less clearly defined and philosophically interesting to thematically contrast against Islam.
There must also be a framework for understanding what Islam is, namely this must include scripture but also extend beyond it as this text cannot stand in a vacuum. This is made hard by an absolute lack of consensus (like most other extant religions).[15] We also have another problem – what is an Islamic utopia, has such a thing ever existed? Even in the time of the prophet? This question is beset by almost nonnavigational controversy in itself, yet alone on the specific question of women.[16] That said, it seems to make no sense to ignore scripture – to make sense of the term Muslim we must accept that they follow the Islamic scripture in some sense. As such, scripture is perhaps the best place to begin investigating the presence of (or lack of) this idea of empowerment within Islam, establishing a context for these ideas. There is a general claim among Feminists that much of the alleged misogyny of the religion is largely cultural, social or political and has little to no basis in actual theology, contrary to popular belief. Despite this, as many have still pointed out, there are some difficult passages concerning women. Alongside this we have problems with the Hadith, or sayings of the prophet, etc.[17] Among these difficult passages are Sura 4:34 which invites men to ‘hit’ their wives. From such grounds, it would appear that we already have an impasse between the two ideas, yet there are theological readings (alongside a great many historical examples and contemporary writings) that rise to counter this view.[18]
Revisionists overcome the problems encountered in these passages by arguing for varying degrees of interpretive theology; usually reframing existing cultural misogyny as ultimately superficial or ungrounded. This is a view espoused by writers like Fatima Mernissi, who advocate a more inherently liberal reading of theology. Perhaps less controversial than a holistically liberal Qur’an (but not without issues), is the idea of patriarchal erroneous entries to the Hadith.[19] Mernissi engages with the veracity of patriarchal ideas presented in the Hadith. From an insider perspective, she notes how popular opinion rejects the idea of women in positions of authority.[20] She recognises the Hadith as not only an exceptionally authoritative text but also a source of misogynistic oppression. She regards it as incongruent to true Islamic reformism and emancipatory efforts in the time of Muhammed, having derailed the egalitarian themes of the religion. In particular, she comments on Abu Bakr’s recollection of the words of the prophet in saying “those who entrust their affairs to a woman will never know prosperity”. This, she claims, is an all too convenient recollection that would require ‘a fabulous memory’.[21] When given Bakr’s personal history of conviction, she argues this amounts to little more than opportunism.[22] As such, she regards the Hadith and other spurious cultural constructions as responsible for much of the perceived intrinsic patriarchy of Islam.
Others, like Amina Wadud, also in defence of Islam, argue for a revised accommodating interpretation of the Qur’an itself. Wadud seems not be able to get around this difficult mention of ‘hitting’. So still there are some Suras that are incredibly and controversially difficult. Indeed, unlike the Hadith, the Qur’an is of purportedly divine origins. As such this approach is subjected to thematic dilution or narrowing. Despite this, Wadud argues that ‘we are the makers of textual meaning’.[23] This may go some way into providing a framework for a revised understanding of women in Islam but can only go so far against more obstinate verses as such readings must have sensitivity to the source; meaning-making must be grounded and consistent. Wadud herself says that this conversation on meaning cannot transcend core principles.[24] So, in light of this it seems one way of reconciling empowerment with Islam is to narrow our view of the religion to encompass a more specific theology and even a more liberal and looser reading of the Qur’an.[25] Though far beyond the barbed and clumsy narrative of an intrinsically and unwaveringly oppressive scripture, we can still see some particularly irreconcilable issues with Islamic scripture and difficult concepts. What we are essentially presented by these revisionist is an appeal to ‘equal footing’ at best, but even this has its problems. Sharma and Young contest that ‘The Qur’an shows no discrimination against women’ yet as the ‘home is a microcosm of the ummah and world community’ we find this positivity narrowly framed.[26] As we shall also see from historical and cultural examples this does not necessarily amount to more considered notions of “empowerment”, only a contextually relative and explicitly religious relative empowerment.
Beyond scripture, we have various historical examples of empowered females in Islam. Among these are Khalifa, Nafisa who recited the Qur’an six thousand times and A’isha whose symbolism, personal connection to the prophet and religious importance are renowned within Islam. A’isha, Muhammed’s later wife also spoke out against certain instances of veiling.[27] Muhammed is even reported to have said ‘take half of your religion from this one’ with regards to A’isha.[28] Khadija, Muhammed’s first wife and mentor is also another prominent example, often invoked.[29] Historian Karen Armstrong references instances such as the prophet ’allowing’ his wives to ‘answer him back’.[30] So not only are these examples (at least partially) progressive but we also see some endorsement of them due to their presence in scripture. Not to mention these examples existing within the relative clarity and conceptual purity of the beginnings of Islam; historically prior to theological controversies and sectarian divisions.
On a more general note, Jean Holm and John Baker, in their work Women In Religion, identify a broad theme of emancipation whereby women were given ‘enhanced status’ under early Islam.[31] Armstrong notes that many women who were attracted to Muhammed’s religion, inclined to ideas of tradition, transcendence, community and modesty.[32] We should also note that she remarks how, even in this time, it was commonplace for women to be used as bargaining chips and constantly threatened with the insecurity of divorce.[33] Margaret Smith identifies that, although pre-Islamic women were considerably ‘more free’ than in later years beyond the Islamic conquests, these restrictions were of a social and legal nature introduced with little to no spiritual essence.[34] These ‘free Beodu women’ were characterised by independence, personal wealth, access to learning and skills and even choice of marriage (and in some cases outright and long-lasting refusal altogether).[35] Indeed, Smith even argues that a kind of chivalry, whereupon women not only exercised their own power, but men catered to it, characterised pre-Islamic society.[36] One could argue that Muhammed also brought about similar kind of chivalry through providing security to women. Chivalry however, like many of these themes, is a difficult notion to reconcile with the empowerment of women, given its arguably patronising views of the feminine under a narrative of gifted protection over support.[37] Though contextually beneficial to an Arabia of the Middle Ages, such a framing which characterises the female with fragility, dependent and relational to men is clearly not an ideal theme to remain unaltered. Modern advocates of Feminism, moving beyond basic legal equality, have noted that even contemporary embodiments of such notions have ‘patronising and condescending attitudes’, with implications of obligatory domestication of women; even correlations with ‘hostile sexism and social dominance orientation’.[38]
These proto-egalitarian motifs from a Pre-Islamic Arabia fed into early Islam. We see this continuity not only in previously mentioned singular examples but general ones such as women fighting alongside the prophet, the idea of an egalitarian household and full access to prayer.[39] Smith continues to argue that whilst Muhammed’s laws generally attempted to emancipate women and secure their safety, these freedoms were in fact later taken away as new traditions became established.[40] Much of this later loss of rights she attributes to a borrowed misogyny from Byzantium and Christendom, particularly the heavy use of the veil, hijacked under the condescending narrative of “protection”.[41]
Yet despite these historical misogynistic introductions, Smith identifies several examples of empowerment within Islam still, focusing heavily upon traditions of Sufi mysticism that continued after these restrictive cultural motifs took hold.[42] Rabia of Basra is held in high regard for her miracles, teachings and writings.[43] As well as Indian Princess, Fatimah, a famous renunciant as examples of autonomy.[44] We might be tempted to look for this elusive total reconciliation in the experiential, the personal and the spiritual in contrast to within heteronomy and orthodoxy.[45] The questions are, whether this mystical element or law is central to Islam (a complex matter of orthodoxy) and whether even this mystical element is truly empowering on a personal level. Islamic society can certainly accommodate female power as a matter of historical fact and there are scriptural grounds on which this is done. This motif of spiritual and even political power can be seen to continue into modernity with prominent Muslims in power such as Baroness Warsi and perhaps one of the stronger examples being the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Bennett notes a contradistinction between Muslim countries having female heads of state where other developed countries have yet to do so.[46] Yet it is probably best we investigate what is happening thematically rather than simply continuing to list empowered females in Islamic history.
Given Sufism’s prominence it seems odd to reject this as a valid form of Islam but we also must contend with more Orthodox forms and legalistic and authoritative sources beyond the Qur’an like the Sunnah and Shariah. Simply ignoring these is theologically difficult. Themes of ‘obedience’, nature denial, subjugation/worship and harsh renunciation still crucially appear in the mystical traditions, albeit are individualistic and self-imposed.[47] This heavily contrasts to feminist existential philosophers like Simone de Beauvoir, who advocates ‘we are totally and inexcusably responsible for our actions’ in a godless world. [48] In this way, non-reliance sheds power relations in the religious sense and thus the accountability to external power. Bergoffen writes on this position, illustrating that ‘some of us evade the responsibilities of freedom by choosing to remain children, that is, to submit to the authority of others’, ‘Looking to return to the security of that metaphysically privileged time’.[49] As a Feminist, de Beauvoir would reject even mysticisms’ power relation.
Other Abrahamic religions perhaps display more thematic denial of women in nature. That is, many religions seem to deny or demonise natural processes such as sex, childbirth, menstruation; demonising the natural instincts as sins that put us at risk of damnation.[50] At the very least they are denoted in their worth as relational to divinity. This is something Holm and Baker note in contrasting Islam and Judeo-Christianity in their views on the feminine.[51] They advocate that the latter is more prescriptive and damning compared to Islam’s idea of giving birth as a witness as opposed to a punishment and that motherhood is seen as a respected honour than a lower task.[52] Whilst other aspects of biology (menstruation, childbirth and sex for example) are apparently not intrinsically unholy but do require the ritualised purification of ghul.[53] Despite these comparative nuances we still seem to miss the notion of sufficient goods and seem to have a domestic framing of femininity in a kind of divinely sanctioned naturalism. That is, the idea of duty, judgement and assumption are still not dispelled and this does not bode well for a view of power relations. We should be suspicious of this ‘separate but equal’ (often private) notion as separation seems to suggest prescriptive or fixed roles for women, rejecting plurality and choice.[54] Given that these examples are commonly quoted by Feminists, it seems often that some apologists seek celebration for awarding the most basic of rights and spiritual equalities to women.
There are of course, many obvious examples of interpretations of Islam that are incommensurably, even earnestly so, in stark opposition to ideas like empowerment. Certain traditionalists and heavily conservative Islam would clearly say these concepts cannot be reconciled and should not be. This is largely a definitional opposition and depends heavily upon how one sees the importance of the Hadith or the nature of the religion.[55] Other Feminists, such as Susan Carter in her work Hislam, have adopted a more widely critical reading of Islamic theology. Ex-Islamic Feminists often make the same claims as these traditionalists and Feminists, highlighting the problem of utter incommensurability with the virtues of Feminism and Islam. It should be noted that though their voice lends something invaluable to the discussion (having come from the religion) it is somewhat stunted by its utter dilution and essentially being a different position. Ayaan Hirsi Ali exemplifies this in her presence amongst the New Atheist Milieu, arguing Islam to be intrinsically misogynistic.[56] In Ayaan’s view, Islam must undergo a sudden radical renewal of liberal introspective theology to save it from violence and to bring it in line with modern thinking. [57] Though this goes some way to establish a view of non-feminist culture this is exceptionally barbed and critical and a difficult theological position, as we shall see.
The issue is whether any of these examples, even in their best light, are equivocal to true empowerment, as opposed to simply a sense of wider meaning and identity. We are forced to contend with questions such as “Is separate but equal still equal?”[58] “Is the exercise of choice to submit still an example of empowerment? Does it even make sense to talk of Islamic ‘rights’ as opposed to ‘duties’ in the religion of submission? If it does, what are the rights of women in Islam compared with that of men?”.[59] A relatively lighthearted video produced by the BBC, attempts to address these questions and challenges claims of the burkha being anti-Feminist. Utilising personal insider testimony, it delves into some of these issues to counter a “misconception” of oppression. In contrast to an outright patriarchy, the women mention concepts such as consent, cosmic meaning, modesty and the fact they are ‘a minority within a minority’ and that some women must ‘fight to wear it’. [60] Yet these questions are clearly more difficult. A choice to surrender power and meaning to an external force denies notions of sufficient and intrinsic good which might make us wonder, what is celebrated or good about the actual women themselves? Surely not any consensual life choice or religious affiliation is a good one. It is probably useful to clarify a difference here between willfully deferring power in a sense of ‘modesty’ and actually being empowered.[61] When we look to the wider commentary on religion we find ideas that are difficult to reconcile with empowerment. Though specifically speaking of Christianity, Nietzsche for example argues, ‘faith has meant a sacrifice: the sacrifice of freedom, pride, spiritual self-confidence; it has meant subjugation and self-derision, self-mutilation’.[62] Nietzsche talks also of ‘self-denial’ and ‘sacrifizio dell’intelletto’ (denial of the intellect).[63]
What the framing of this conversation also fails to understand is that between obligation and freedom there is a broad spectrum of loaded choice. It is the decisions that occupy this place that modern Feminism in the Western world tasks itself with engaging with; can a woman be a Feminist nude model for instance? In many cases, this would be an exercise of choice, yet there is a whole unexplored language of conformity, social themes and existentialism. Ultimately this is delving into deeper questions of what truly empowered feminine flourishing might look like, something that Walter does in her exploration of exploitive nightclub culture against the backdrop of ‘choice’, a word that is used frequently in these hypersexualized settings.[64] Yet despite the practice of choice, these women are still objectified, reduced to aesthetic pleasure and denied their holistic subject, and not always in the way intended.[65] It is exactly this honest critical engagement which seems swept aside in discussion of religious empowerment.
We encounter several problems when we hit on this strange and clumsy assumption that Islam is no more inherently misogynistic than Christianity and Judaism, but simply needs to “catch up like they have”, as they are ‘500 years behind’.[66] Namely, this assumes a notion of linear progression that simply does not exist as such commentators would like to imagine. Moreover, though there is evidently some room for theological revision, we are ultimately presented with a fundamentally different theology; one that is more robust and rigid. Imagining certain moves within this space often lead to the awkward question of dilution and ahistorical inappropriateness.[67] In any case, empowerment is no less necessarily absent from this religion than many of its counterparts and for it to ideationally and persuasively take hold this would, should and could not require some bizarre parody of a “protestant reformation”. The idea of reformation already exists within Islam, firmly rooted as an idea of constant revision and renewal.[68] Ultimately, this is a theologically insensitive view of religion which projects an alien agenda and an incompatible discourse.[69] That isn’t to say that certain interpretations don’t vehemently try to reconcile more liberal ideas with theology, as we have seen. And of course, largely this lack of correlation is not the stark and blunt contrast as imagined by tabloid newspapers but with deeper subtleties, nuances and a wide spectrum of observance. What we are questioning is the meaningful sense this makes, both conceptually and practically.
If we were to argue that Islam is compatible with Feminism we would have to do so with many caveats; namely refining our definitions of both terms, arguably stretching them beyond what is ideationally, linguistically and pragmatically useful or recognisable. On one hand, we are faced with a discourse with some “Feministic” nuances, inspiring historical examples, contextual improvements for women and a theological or spiritual intention to somewhat provide egalitarianism and fulfilment.[70] Conversely, this Islamic Feminism is ultimately limited in its general meaning and feminism is, for a myriad of reasons, not the most sensical of words to deploy in many Islamic contexts. Even the most apologetic Islamic Feminists must contend with an overwhelming cultural patriarchy, rooted in understanding of theology as well as politics and therefore must contend with misogynists on theological grounds. We might be tempted of course, to say that this theology is largely ungrounded in scripture. Yet, even in this optimistically positive context this reduces our notion of a Feministic Islam to explicitly critical revisionist interpretations or purely mystical traditions, denying all others.[71] Such narrow notions thus deny the legitimacy of the social element of religion, reducing true Islam to the almost purely theoretical.
Aside from defining Islam, we have an issue of defining Feminism. If we accept our philosophical definition involving autonomy and equality we begin to enquire whether religiosity in a general sense is reconcilable with these notions.[72] Again, this is not entirely incommensurable as many religious Feminists have argued, yet still requires a plethora of caveats to engage with these difficult questions. In taking this idea of Feminism away from its basic notion of simply ‘equal rights’ we might wish to say that, while early Islam supports the latter it is slower to respond to the former. That is, a political, economic and nominally spiritual equality is one thing and a great progressive step relative to its time. Yet without examining the principles behind these we are left with a potentially outdated notion of the feminine (rejecting its plurality), narrow ideas of empowerment and as a result, poor cultural footing.[73] We also seem to be implying that Islam can and should want this incommensurable discourse for itself, but under a discourse of self-discipline, the idea of empowerment seems ultimately misplaced. Though it should go without saying that this is not a problem unique to Islam and one that all religions contend with. Despite efforts and nuances, these are irreconcilable languages and are intended to be as such; the notions that religions can and should “catch up” is almost nonsensical. Such a combination of discourse is incredibly difficult, if not meaningless to achieve, conceptually and practically, depending on how far we think we can stretch our definitions. The shallower our empowerment and controversially diluted our religion gets in its rejection of sources and culture, the easier this becomes. Arguably, true Feministic empowerment is best found elsewhere.
[1] Joe L. Kincheloe, Shirley R. Steinberg, Christopher Darius Stonebanks, Teaching Against Islamophobia (Bern: Peter Lang, 2010) p. 13
[2] Roy Jackson in Interview with Dr Georgina Jardim: Women’s Rights In Islam, University of Gloucestershire, https://moodle.glos.ac.uk/moodle/mod/page/view.php?id=319716&inpopup=1 [Accessed 7 November 2017] (00:00-00:12)
[3] With the presence of Islamic Feminists, Islamic misogynists and anti-Islamic Feminists among the contributors.
[4] Raymond Taras, Xenophobia and Islamophobia in Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012) p. 86
[5] Tauriq Moosa, Big Think, To Criticise Islam, 2016 http://bigthink.com/against-the-new-taboo/to-criticise-islam [Accessed 2 December 2017]
[6] Arvid Sharma and Katherine K. Young, Feminism and World Religions (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999) p. 275
[7] Kristin Aune, Why Feminists Are Less Religious, The Guardian, 29 March 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2011/mar/29/why-Feminists-less-religious-survey [Accessed 22 November 2017]
A fact that we must face is whether any religion, yet alone one with obvious problems (as any Muslims would most likely point out).
[8] Sheila Jeffreys, Man's Dominion: The Rise of Religion and the Eclipse of Women's Rights (London: Routledge, 2013) p. 1943
[9] Ibid. p. 1947
[10] Madeleine Grumet in Lynda Stone, Gail Masuchika Boldt, The Education Feminism Reader (London: Psychology Press, 1994) p. 149
[11] Susan James in Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy, The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) p. 493
[12] Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2014) p. 95
[13] Chandra in Sushama Sahay, Women and Empowerment: Approaches and Strategies (New Delhi: Discovery Publishing House, 1998) p. 18
[14] Jessica Valenti, The Guardian, Living Dolls: The Return of Sexism by Natasha Walter, 31st January 2010 https://www.theguardian.com/books/2010/jan/31/living-dolls-natasha-walter [Accessed 01 December 2017]
[15] Roy Jackson in Interview with Dr Georgina Jardim (1:00-1:17)
[16] Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Concept of an Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan (London: Frances Pinter, 1987) p. 143
[17] We should be mindful that the Sunni tradition of Islam dominates most of its history. As such, (while attempting to avoid heteronomous narratives), we must understand much of the theology and thought explored here to be largely against the backdrop of this broad interpretation.
[18] Jardim in Interview with Dr Georgina Jardim: Women’s Rights In Islam (2:50-3:36)
[19] Namely that, despite certain conditional requirements to ensure the validity of the text, there are many contested and spurious entries within
[20] Mernissi, Fatima, A Feminist Interpretation of Women's Rights in Islam, Kurzman, C, (1998) Liberal Islam: a sourcebook, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 112-113
[21] Mernissi, F, ‘The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women’s Rights in Islam’ (1991) p. 115
‘Kurzman, C. Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook, (New York: OUP USA, 1998) pp.112-126
[22] Consequently, such additions are not sound (sahih) within its own theological rules.
[23] Amina Wadud, Qur'an and Woman: Re-Reading the Sacred Text from a Woman's Perspective, (New York: OUP USA, 1999) p. 203
[24] Ibid.
[25] Though this navigation of meaning is ultimately true it still has limitations with certain conceptual problems, namely the issue of conceptual dilution.
[26] ‘If seen through a non-patriarchal lens’ and ignoring other explicitly discriminatory texts and restricting positivity to “domestic duties”.
Sharman and Young, Feminism and World Religions, p. 275
[27] Margaret Smith, Muslim Women Mystics (Oxford: Oneworld, 2001) p. 150
[28] Holm and Baker, Women In Religion p. 88-89
[29] Jean Holm and John Baker, Women In Religion (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1994) p. 86
[30] Karen Armstrong, Islam: A Short History (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2000) p. 14
[31] Holm and Baker, Women In Religion p. xii
[32] Armstrong, Islam: A Short History p. 144 & p. 4
[33] Ibid. p. 15
[34] Smith p. 141-142 and p. 164
[35] Ibid. p. 148
[36] Ibid. p. 142
[37] Runjhun Noopur, Huffington Post, Chivalry Isn’t What You Think It Is! A Woman Explains, 28 April 2017 https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/chivalry-isnt-what-you-think-it-is-woman-splaining_us_59036faae4b084f59b49f88a [Accessed 8 December 2017]
[38] Kristin J. Anderson, Modern Misogyny: Anti-Feminism in a Post-Feminist Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) p. 63
[39] Smith p. 150, 152 and 153-4
[40] Ibid. p. 155-156
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid. p. 232
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] After all, these more individualistic forms of Islam at least avoid the idea of cultural oppression and patriarchal restrictions in a more overt way. Potentially, in this way they are compatible with Feminism, though often not entirely detached from the male will.
[46] Clinton Bennett, Muslim Women of Power: Gender, Politics and Culture in Islam (London: A&C Black, 2010) p. 36
[47] Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1981) p. 100
[48] Debra Bergoffen, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Simone de Beauvoir, 2014, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/beauvoir/ [Accessed 21 October 2017]
[49] Ibid.
This question of power thus relates to moral and authoritative power.
[50] Julian Young, Friedrich Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) p. 512
[51] Holm and Baker, Women In Religion p. 86-87
[52] Ibid. p. 88
[53] Ibid. p. 87
[54] Ibid. p. xiii
[55] Jardim in Interview with Dr Georgina Jardim (06:43-7:00)
[56] Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Heretic: Why Islam Needs a Reformation now (New York: Harper Collins, 2015) p. 28
[57] Ibid. p. 12
[58] As we have discussed this separation frames an immutable difference and thus a restrictive role.
[59] As with most religions, duties is perhaps a more apt word.
[60] BBC Three, Things Not To Say To Someone Who Wears a Burqa, Facebook, 21 October 2017, https://www.facebook.com/bbcthree/videos/10155232557455787/ [Accessed 22 October 2017]
[61] Modesty is another term that warrants examination. Modesty as opposed to what, for instance? How and why is veiling exactly a practice of modesty? This seems to frame nature and natural femininity in a very pessimistic manner.
[62] Fredrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2002) p. 44
[63] Ibid. p. 121
[64] Natasha Walter, Living Dolls: The Return of Sexism (Milton: Hachette UK, 2011) p. 3
[65] This is veritably a more subjective conversation, but by no means a subsequently invalid or meaningless one.
[66] Andrew B. R. Elliott, Medievalism, Politics and Mass Media: Appropriating the Middle Ages in the Twenty-First Century (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2017) p. 100
[67] Mehdi Hasan, Why Islam Doesn’t Need a Reformation, 17 May 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/17/islam-reformation-extremism-muslim-martin-luther-europe {Accessed 10 November 2017]
[68] Michelle Browers and Charles Kurzman, An Islamic Reformation? (Lanham, Lexington Books, 2004) p. 28
[69] There is only so far a stick can bend and this depends on both the thickness of the stick (level of orthodoxy) and type of wood (the religion).
[70] This scriptural, almost theoretical “proto-Feminism” is no less clearly defined than in many other religions.
[71] Not to mention that this notion of a clean theological/cultural split is somewhat inaccurate.
[72] Indeed, these ideas arguably go beyond gender and hit on broader concepts of flourishing, virtue and fulfilment; a harder strain of thought for religion still (yet probably too far from our original question to weigh in significantly).
[73] The notions of empowerment and the feminine we have explored offer themselves in a narrow context, rejecting diversity and restricting expression to a series of roles or duties.