Nietszche's Beyond Good & Evil: An Analysis
[Written by Joe for an undergraduate philosophy essay]
Affirmation
Section 56 of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil (BGE) illustrates Nietzsche’s ideal of ‘the most audacious, lively and world affirming human being’.[1] Nietzsche’s ideal of affirmation however takes its starting point from a belief in pessimism, the notion that because there is no God, humans are mortal, life is full of suffering and pain, and the world is generally at odds with human desire, we should take a negative view of life.[2] It is this seemingly paradoxical theme of affirmation through a belief in pessimism that I intend to explore in this and other sections in Beyond Good and Evil. Regarding the context of Nietzsche’s views on the death of God in BGE, it is already given that ‘God is dead’, a belief first declared by Nietzsche in The Gay Science. Therefore, BGE is concerned more with the implications of the death of God and the subsequent loss of a belief in eternal values than with justifying reasons for atheism.[3] To say that ‘God is dead’ is to recognise that the belief in the Christian worldview has become unworthy of belief. If there are no objective values that stem from religion, and any credible hope for an eternal life in another world has dissolved with it, then life seemingly has no goal or meaning. Nihilism, the extreme form of pessimism which takes the view that because of life is meaningless, it is not worth living, is commonly presented as a direct consequence of the death of God.[4] Section 56 contains Nietzsche’s view on the limits of previous contributors to pessimistic and nihilistic thought- the Buddha and Schopenhauer. This section also introduces the idea of the ‘eternal recurrence’, a concept which again was introduced before BGE.[5] Nietzsche’s formulation thus aims to purify the doctrine of pessimism from the imperfections that Schopenhauer, its modern inventor, had introduced to it.[6]
I understand Nietzsche’s philosophical project in this section as an overcoming of nihilism through an acceptance of pessimism. That is, a reconfiguration of the previous conclusions made that existence has no positive value because life is full of suffering, and lacks meaning. In doing this, Nietzsche is separating pessimism from nihilism, choosing to embrace the fact that there is suffering and no meaning to life yet avoiding the Schopenhauerian conclusion that this robs existence of any affirming worth.[7] To further interpret Nietzsche’s views in this section as well as understand how an acceptance of the inherent meaningless of life can be life affirming, rather than unescapably negative, we must understand both where Nietzsche departs from Schopenhauer and what is meant by eternal recurrence; the basis for his alternative to nihilism. Firstly, we must examine Nietzsche’s refutation of pessimistic thought at the start of section 56 to illustrate what he sees as the limits of the nihilistic conclusion that he seeks to overcome. Stating that he has had the ‘desire to think down into the depths of pessimism and redeem it from the half-Christian, half- German narrowness and simplicity from which it has recently been portrayed, namely in the form of Schopenhauerian philosophy’, it is clear that Nietzsche sees Schopenhauer as coming to the wrong conclusion about the meaning of pessimism.[8]
Nihilism for Nietzsche involves what he called the ‘the will turning against life’.[9] This declaration is significant, as it is a denial of life, a turning away from life, that Schopenhauer prescribes as a solution to the problem of suffering.[10] In citing ‘half-Christian’ narrowness as characterising Schopenhauerian philosophy in section 56, Nietzsche makes it clear that moral judgments about the world have no place in his pessimism. Rather than embracing the natural chaos of a Godless, and by extension meaningless, universe, Schopenhauer drew a judgment against such a world, based on a moral standard that placed value in the negation of individual selfhood and in the extinction of our natural attachment to life.[11] Schopenhauer had seemingly for Nietzsche betrayed the logical outcome of his own pessimism at the last possible moment by denying the results of his ontology on an unverifiable moral basis.[12] Supporting this, in section 186 of BGE he states that Schopenhauer is ‘a pessimist who stops short at the problem of morality, says yes to morality… Is this person really- a pessimist?’.[13] It is clear that from Nietzsche’s point of view, Schopenhauer has missed the logical outcome of his own pessimism. True pessimism, one which has looked into ‘the most world-denying of all possible ways of thinking’, must therefore totally accept the meaninglessness of human existence without passing judgement on its goodness.[14] Though Schopenhauer has posed the question of the meaning of existence, his response used an essentially Christian morality as a buffer against confronting unbearable pessimism. Schopenhauer, in Nietzsche’s view, recognises that life is full of suffering and gives up on the consolation of an after-life, but clings on to order through ascribing rights and wrongs to life. Schopenhauer’s explicit denial of life as a moral aim leads Nietzsche to classify his thought as nihilistic.[15]
Nietzsche next states that his pessimism seeks to go ‘beyond good and evil’, thus escaping traditional moral evaluations (‘delusions’) of the meaninglessness of life, a trap that both the Buddha and Schopenhauer had fallen into.[16] While Nietzsche agrees with Schopenhauer on the fundamental principles of pessimism, that life is meaningless and full of suffering, Nietzsche has established his objections to a pessimism that results in nihilism, on the basis of moral scepticism. We can see that Nietzsche’s ‘opposite ideal’ must, in opposition to the life-negating philosophy of nihilism, be life-affirming. Nietzsche’s opposite ideal person ‘accept[s] and bear[s] that which has been and is, but also wants to have it over again, just as it was and is, throughout all eternity’.[17] This is Nietzsche’s principle of the eternal recurrence, the notion that the events of the world will recur in an eternal cycle, where each cycle is exactly the same as the last.[18] Already we can see where Nietzsche’s ideal diverges from Schopenhauer’s values, in his suggestion that the ideal person will accept what is without turning away from it. As Nietzsche does not specify the extent to which the eternal recurrence should be considered his cosmological account of how the world actually is however, there are two differing interpretations of his concept. Either the concept of the eternal recurrence asserts that it is actually the case that all the events that constitute the order of the universe repeat themselves, in a vast cycle, forever- the cosmological or metaphysical reading. Or it serves as a thought experiment that highlights that there is something significant about the kind of person who could genuinely desire that the universe should repeat itself in this manner- the practical, psychological reading.[19]
In revealing the eternal recurrence, according to the cosmological reading, Nietzsche is trying to determine a person’s reaction to how things in fact are. If we think of the eternal recurrence as a fact, then affirming life requires welcoming its eternal recurrence because it is a property of that life. I would like to focus however on the practical significance of the idea of the eternal recurrence as an unrealistic thought experiment, not as a cosmological truth claim. The broad idea is that one imagines the endless return of life, and one’s emotional reaction to that prospect reveals something about how valuable one’s life has been.[20] As Burnham states, given the distance Nietzsche seeks to establish between himself and any straightforward truth claims about the natural world in other sections of BGE, the psychological interpretation of section 56 appears more natural, as the opposite ideal is of a person who wills this eternity rather than just acknowledges it as a fact.[21] The evaluative use that can be made out of one’s reaction to the thought of the eternal recurrence, irrespective of which standpoint you take, does not presuppose the actual cosmological truth of the doctrine.[22] Thus, a willing of the eternal recurrence that Nietzsche demonstrates in section 56 tells me what sort of attitude I am expected to adopt towards my life, regardless of what reading of the eternal recurrence we opt for. The important question is no longer whether I can establish that my life will eternally recur, but what the claim of the eternal recurrence tells us about the nature of Nietzsche’s affirmation.[23] In suggesting that the ideal person will affirm eternal recurrence, ‘calling out insatiably da capo [from the beginning], not only to himself, but to the whole drama, the whole spectacle’, Nietzsche is calling for more than just an affirmation of the past or the present, but for the future.[24]
To will the eternal recurrence is to will endless suffering. As Dienstag states, it is not enough simply to withdraw our condemnation of suffering in accepting it, that would be equivalent to being agnostic about life itself. Instead, we must approve of suffering.[25] Thus, in being truly affirming whilst still being pessimistic, Nietzsche must show in his eternal recurrence that the aspects of existence condemned by nihilism, such as suffering, are not only bearable, but desirable. In affirming the perpetual continuation of suffering, Nietzsche’s ideal can reach true world-affirmation through the depths of pessimism. Whilst satisfying the conditions of a belief in pessimism, Nietzsche’s ideal human takes them further, demonstrating another pessimistic extreme through a total rejection of the life-negation found in nihilism. This is not to say that Nietzsche saw his ideal as a form of optimism. Rather, he characterized himself in terms of what he calls ‘Dionysian pessimism’. The chief trait of Nietzsche’s Dionysian pessimism is that, while recognizing the terrible and questionable in life, it is still able to affirm life.[26]
Nietzsche in this section has positioned his ideal as the ultimate yes-sayer; saying yes to suffering, chaos and the self, as he states in Ecce Homo: ‘Yes- saying without reservation, even to suffering, even to guilt, even to everything that is questionable and strange in existence’.[27] Nietzsche’s ideal opposes a denial of life, going beyond categorisations of good and evil in avoiding traditional moral evaluations of the world. Nietzsche is instead advocating that we face up to the absence of God with courage, clear vision and strength, proposing an ideal that encompasses these qualities. The best attitude to take in a situation of pessimism is one where human beings grow and change to meet the challenges of this situation, rather than seek to negate or abandon life in a Schopenhauerian, nihilistic sense.[28] It is in sharing the same assumptions as nihilism before him, but coming to a different conclusion, that Nietzsche has accomplished the seemingly paradoxical formula of life-affirmation through a belief in pessimism in section 56.
Some Questions...
Why is Nietzsche referring to a sphinx in section 1 and what does he mean by it?
In Greek Mythology the sphinx figure asked travellers a riddle, killing them if they failed to answer correctly. The hero Oedipus answered the riddle correctly, causing the sphinx to destroy itself. Sam convincingly suggested the sphinx in Nietzsche’s metaphor is the will to truth, driving philosophers to ask questions in search of an objective answer, and that questioning the value of truth would be like putting questions to the sphinx- asking the truth about truth. Sam also discussed that Nietzsche could be indicating the dangers of asking about the value of truth, as in the myth either the questioner or the questioned is destroyed, and the truth for Oedipus leads to tragedy.
Is Nietzsche setting up his own herd mentality in detailing in what the new philosophers should do and be?
Asking Brett this question during his seminar presentation, Brett answered that Nietzsche intended for his new philosophers to question every existing philosophical system and philosopher, even Nietzsche, in their revaluation of values. In doing this, the new philosophers are in keeping with his assertion in section 43 that it is certain that the new philosophers will not be dogmatists, as it is dogmatism that has led to the state of moral herd-mentality that Nietzsche claims was present at the time of his writing. Brett answered the question satisfactorily, putting forward a convincing understanding of Nietzsche’s intention for the section.
Socrates’ method involved constant questioning and deconstructions, what is the difference between his philosophical approach and Nietzsche’s?
Discussing section 212, Alex answered that although Nietzsche uses Socrates as a good example of philosophy acting in bad conscience of its age, Socrates was questioning in search of an objective truth whereas Nietzsche doesn’t search for that, arguing there is no such thing as objective truth. Alex convincingly understood why Nietzsche was using Socrates as an example, as well as understanding why Nietzsche distinguishes him from his proposed new philosophers.
Section 56 of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil (BGE) illustrates Nietzsche’s ideal of ‘the most audacious, lively and world affirming human being’.[1] Nietzsche’s ideal of affirmation however takes its starting point from a belief in pessimism, the notion that because there is no God, humans are mortal, life is full of suffering and pain, and the world is generally at odds with human desire, we should take a negative view of life.[2] It is this seemingly paradoxical theme of affirmation through a belief in pessimism that I intend to explore in this and other sections in Beyond Good and Evil. Regarding the context of Nietzsche’s views on the death of God in BGE, it is already given that ‘God is dead’, a belief first declared by Nietzsche in The Gay Science. Therefore, BGE is concerned more with the implications of the death of God and the subsequent loss of a belief in eternal values than with justifying reasons for atheism.[3] To say that ‘God is dead’ is to recognise that the belief in the Christian worldview has become unworthy of belief. If there are no objective values that stem from religion, and any credible hope for an eternal life in another world has dissolved with it, then life seemingly has no goal or meaning. Nihilism, the extreme form of pessimism which takes the view that because of life is meaningless, it is not worth living, is commonly presented as a direct consequence of the death of God.[4] Section 56 contains Nietzsche’s view on the limits of previous contributors to pessimistic and nihilistic thought- the Buddha and Schopenhauer. This section also introduces the idea of the ‘eternal recurrence’, a concept which again was introduced before BGE.[5] Nietzsche’s formulation thus aims to purify the doctrine of pessimism from the imperfections that Schopenhauer, its modern inventor, had introduced to it.[6]
I understand Nietzsche’s philosophical project in this section as an overcoming of nihilism through an acceptance of pessimism. That is, a reconfiguration of the previous conclusions made that existence has no positive value because life is full of suffering, and lacks meaning. In doing this, Nietzsche is separating pessimism from nihilism, choosing to embrace the fact that there is suffering and no meaning to life yet avoiding the Schopenhauerian conclusion that this robs existence of any affirming worth.[7] To further interpret Nietzsche’s views in this section as well as understand how an acceptance of the inherent meaningless of life can be life affirming, rather than unescapably negative, we must understand both where Nietzsche departs from Schopenhauer and what is meant by eternal recurrence; the basis for his alternative to nihilism. Firstly, we must examine Nietzsche’s refutation of pessimistic thought at the start of section 56 to illustrate what he sees as the limits of the nihilistic conclusion that he seeks to overcome. Stating that he has had the ‘desire to think down into the depths of pessimism and redeem it from the half-Christian, half- German narrowness and simplicity from which it has recently been portrayed, namely in the form of Schopenhauerian philosophy’, it is clear that Nietzsche sees Schopenhauer as coming to the wrong conclusion about the meaning of pessimism.[8]
Nihilism for Nietzsche involves what he called the ‘the will turning against life’.[9] This declaration is significant, as it is a denial of life, a turning away from life, that Schopenhauer prescribes as a solution to the problem of suffering.[10] In citing ‘half-Christian’ narrowness as characterising Schopenhauerian philosophy in section 56, Nietzsche makes it clear that moral judgments about the world have no place in his pessimism. Rather than embracing the natural chaos of a Godless, and by extension meaningless, universe, Schopenhauer drew a judgment against such a world, based on a moral standard that placed value in the negation of individual selfhood and in the extinction of our natural attachment to life.[11] Schopenhauer had seemingly for Nietzsche betrayed the logical outcome of his own pessimism at the last possible moment by denying the results of his ontology on an unverifiable moral basis.[12] Supporting this, in section 186 of BGE he states that Schopenhauer is ‘a pessimist who stops short at the problem of morality, says yes to morality… Is this person really- a pessimist?’.[13] It is clear that from Nietzsche’s point of view, Schopenhauer has missed the logical outcome of his own pessimism. True pessimism, one which has looked into ‘the most world-denying of all possible ways of thinking’, must therefore totally accept the meaninglessness of human existence without passing judgement on its goodness.[14] Though Schopenhauer has posed the question of the meaning of existence, his response used an essentially Christian morality as a buffer against confronting unbearable pessimism. Schopenhauer, in Nietzsche’s view, recognises that life is full of suffering and gives up on the consolation of an after-life, but clings on to order through ascribing rights and wrongs to life. Schopenhauer’s explicit denial of life as a moral aim leads Nietzsche to classify his thought as nihilistic.[15]
Nietzsche next states that his pessimism seeks to go ‘beyond good and evil’, thus escaping traditional moral evaluations (‘delusions’) of the meaninglessness of life, a trap that both the Buddha and Schopenhauer had fallen into.[16] While Nietzsche agrees with Schopenhauer on the fundamental principles of pessimism, that life is meaningless and full of suffering, Nietzsche has established his objections to a pessimism that results in nihilism, on the basis of moral scepticism. We can see that Nietzsche’s ‘opposite ideal’ must, in opposition to the life-negating philosophy of nihilism, be life-affirming. Nietzsche’s opposite ideal person ‘accept[s] and bear[s] that which has been and is, but also wants to have it over again, just as it was and is, throughout all eternity’.[17] This is Nietzsche’s principle of the eternal recurrence, the notion that the events of the world will recur in an eternal cycle, where each cycle is exactly the same as the last.[18] Already we can see where Nietzsche’s ideal diverges from Schopenhauer’s values, in his suggestion that the ideal person will accept what is without turning away from it. As Nietzsche does not specify the extent to which the eternal recurrence should be considered his cosmological account of how the world actually is however, there are two differing interpretations of his concept. Either the concept of the eternal recurrence asserts that it is actually the case that all the events that constitute the order of the universe repeat themselves, in a vast cycle, forever- the cosmological or metaphysical reading. Or it serves as a thought experiment that highlights that there is something significant about the kind of person who could genuinely desire that the universe should repeat itself in this manner- the practical, psychological reading.[19]
In revealing the eternal recurrence, according to the cosmological reading, Nietzsche is trying to determine a person’s reaction to how things in fact are. If we think of the eternal recurrence as a fact, then affirming life requires welcoming its eternal recurrence because it is a property of that life. I would like to focus however on the practical significance of the idea of the eternal recurrence as an unrealistic thought experiment, not as a cosmological truth claim. The broad idea is that one imagines the endless return of life, and one’s emotional reaction to that prospect reveals something about how valuable one’s life has been.[20] As Burnham states, given the distance Nietzsche seeks to establish between himself and any straightforward truth claims about the natural world in other sections of BGE, the psychological interpretation of section 56 appears more natural, as the opposite ideal is of a person who wills this eternity rather than just acknowledges it as a fact.[21] The evaluative use that can be made out of one’s reaction to the thought of the eternal recurrence, irrespective of which standpoint you take, does not presuppose the actual cosmological truth of the doctrine.[22] Thus, a willing of the eternal recurrence that Nietzsche demonstrates in section 56 tells me what sort of attitude I am expected to adopt towards my life, regardless of what reading of the eternal recurrence we opt for. The important question is no longer whether I can establish that my life will eternally recur, but what the claim of the eternal recurrence tells us about the nature of Nietzsche’s affirmation.[23] In suggesting that the ideal person will affirm eternal recurrence, ‘calling out insatiably da capo [from the beginning], not only to himself, but to the whole drama, the whole spectacle’, Nietzsche is calling for more than just an affirmation of the past or the present, but for the future.[24]
To will the eternal recurrence is to will endless suffering. As Dienstag states, it is not enough simply to withdraw our condemnation of suffering in accepting it, that would be equivalent to being agnostic about life itself. Instead, we must approve of suffering.[25] Thus, in being truly affirming whilst still being pessimistic, Nietzsche must show in his eternal recurrence that the aspects of existence condemned by nihilism, such as suffering, are not only bearable, but desirable. In affirming the perpetual continuation of suffering, Nietzsche’s ideal can reach true world-affirmation through the depths of pessimism. Whilst satisfying the conditions of a belief in pessimism, Nietzsche’s ideal human takes them further, demonstrating another pessimistic extreme through a total rejection of the life-negation found in nihilism. This is not to say that Nietzsche saw his ideal as a form of optimism. Rather, he characterized himself in terms of what he calls ‘Dionysian pessimism’. The chief trait of Nietzsche’s Dionysian pessimism is that, while recognizing the terrible and questionable in life, it is still able to affirm life.[26]
Nietzsche in this section has positioned his ideal as the ultimate yes-sayer; saying yes to suffering, chaos and the self, as he states in Ecce Homo: ‘Yes- saying without reservation, even to suffering, even to guilt, even to everything that is questionable and strange in existence’.[27] Nietzsche’s ideal opposes a denial of life, going beyond categorisations of good and evil in avoiding traditional moral evaluations of the world. Nietzsche is instead advocating that we face up to the absence of God with courage, clear vision and strength, proposing an ideal that encompasses these qualities. The best attitude to take in a situation of pessimism is one where human beings grow and change to meet the challenges of this situation, rather than seek to negate or abandon life in a Schopenhauerian, nihilistic sense.[28] It is in sharing the same assumptions as nihilism before him, but coming to a different conclusion, that Nietzsche has accomplished the seemingly paradoxical formula of life-affirmation through a belief in pessimism in section 56.
Some Questions...
Why is Nietzsche referring to a sphinx in section 1 and what does he mean by it?
In Greek Mythology the sphinx figure asked travellers a riddle, killing them if they failed to answer correctly. The hero Oedipus answered the riddle correctly, causing the sphinx to destroy itself. Sam convincingly suggested the sphinx in Nietzsche’s metaphor is the will to truth, driving philosophers to ask questions in search of an objective answer, and that questioning the value of truth would be like putting questions to the sphinx- asking the truth about truth. Sam also discussed that Nietzsche could be indicating the dangers of asking about the value of truth, as in the myth either the questioner or the questioned is destroyed, and the truth for Oedipus leads to tragedy.
Is Nietzsche setting up his own herd mentality in detailing in what the new philosophers should do and be?
Asking Brett this question during his seminar presentation, Brett answered that Nietzsche intended for his new philosophers to question every existing philosophical system and philosopher, even Nietzsche, in their revaluation of values. In doing this, the new philosophers are in keeping with his assertion in section 43 that it is certain that the new philosophers will not be dogmatists, as it is dogmatism that has led to the state of moral herd-mentality that Nietzsche claims was present at the time of his writing. Brett answered the question satisfactorily, putting forward a convincing understanding of Nietzsche’s intention for the section.
Socrates’ method involved constant questioning and deconstructions, what is the difference between his philosophical approach and Nietzsche’s?
Discussing section 212, Alex answered that although Nietzsche uses Socrates as a good example of philosophy acting in bad conscience of its age, Socrates was questioning in search of an objective truth whereas Nietzsche doesn’t search for that, arguing there is no such thing as objective truth. Alex convincingly understood why Nietzsche was using Socrates as an example, as well as understanding why Nietzsche distinguishes him from his proposed new philosophers.
[1] Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. by Marion Faber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) p.50 §56
[2] Gareth Southwell, A Beginner’s Guide to Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) p.144
[3] Roy Jackson, ‘An Approach to Reading Beyond Good and Evil’, Think, Vol.2.Issue 6 (2004) p.44
[4] Bernard Reginster, The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism, (London: Harvard University Press, 2008) pp.8-9
[5] Jackson, p.44
[6] Joshua Foa Dienstag, Pessimism: Philosophy, Ethic, Spirit, (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006) p.177
[7] Ken Gemes and Christopher Janaway, ‘Life-Denial versus Life-Affirmation’, in A Companion to Schopenhauer, ed. by Bart Vandenbeele (Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011) p. 290
[8] Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p.50 §56
[9] Friedrich Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morals & Ecce Homo, ed. by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1989) p.19 Nietzsche’s preface §5
[10] Gemes and Janaway, p.290
[11] Ibid., p.282
[12] Dienstag, p. 176-177
[13] Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p.75 §186
[14] Ibid., p.50 §56
[15] Gemes and Janaway, p. 281, 289
[16] Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p.50 §56
[17] Ibid.
[18] Southwell, p.50
[19] Douglas Burnham, Reading Nietzsche: An Analysis of Beyond Good and Evil, (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2007) p.83
[20] Anderson R. Lanier, ‘Friedrich Nietzsche’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford University, 2017) <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/#Affi> [accessed 12 June 2019]
[21] Burnham, p.84
[22] Andrew Huddleston, ‘Affirmation, Admirable Overvaluation, and the Eternal Recurrence’, in Nietzsche on Morality and Affirmation, Forthcoming, ed. by Daniel Came (Oxford: Oxford University Press) p.7 <https://www.academia.edu/19646131/Affirmation_Admirable_Overvaluation_and_the_Eternal_Recurrence> [accessed 14 June 2019]
[23] Reginster, p. 14
[24] Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p.50 §56
[25] Dienstag, pp.190-191
[26] Gemes and Janaway, p.294
[27] Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morals & Ecce Homo, p.272 ‘The Birth of Tragedy’ § 2
[28] Southwell, pp.144-145