Should Philosophy Concern Itself With Religion?
[Written by Connor for a philosophy Masters]
As a field which endeavours to enquire into the heart of questions concerning existence, knowledge, ethics, mortality, free-will, language and a good many others it could be said that, in some manner, philosophy concerns virtually all other subjects through its rich examination of propositions.[1] Indeed, in many senses philosophy is a discourse unique in its breadth and scope of ‘unrestricted subject matter’.[2] The question of philosophy’s validity to comment on religion however is slightly different; more to do with the conceptuality of religion against the rhetoric of reason than a matter of philosophy’s breadth and ideational purity. The question here is a conceptual one – of whether the traditional notion of philosophy, or indeed any of its wider interpretations and traditions, are compatible, complimentary even, to the domain of religion and the conceptual realm of faith. That is, can philosophy’s inquest into reason and values be coherently understood when it comes to the world of religion? Many have argued that religion is a realm exempt from the rational analytical gaze of philosophy and even its more poetic existential contemplations, and for good reason. Others have argued that they are more homogenous than we might imagine - that they can and should be intellectually married.
Many who have criticised the intellectual blending of these two discourses stand from varied viewpoints of both religiosity and the philosophical tradition. These critics often advocate that the essence of religion is essentially opposed to notions of, at the very least, traditional thought in philosophy.[3] There is a strong case to be made here whereby examination of the Western discourse known as the “philosophy of religion” can demonstrably be shown to be largely invalid. This is palpable throughout history, exemplified by the syncretic blurring of Aristotelian metaphysics and Catholic theology from thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas, criticised by both the faithful and philosophical. It is also particularly true when one glances at the state of debate in modernity as dialogues continue to bear little fruit under the guise of the ilk of Richard Dawkins, who to the annoyance of atheists and theists alike, abortively challenges the rationality of countless believers.
Thus, though there is no doubt a rich and intimate relationship of engagement between the two, philosophy and religion do appear to be linked albeit distinct concepts, often principally converse. However, when we expand this narrative to encompass Eastern thought we find it sits much less comfortably. Moving beyond traditional and academically comfortable notions of both religion and philosophy we begin to see that this narrative, which is largely applicable in the traditions of Western thought, is a much more difficult exaction here.[4] In fact, when the existentialism of Buddhist and even the (perhaps) less obvious example of Hindu thinking are consulted, the conceptual blurring may even be good cause to consider an alternative narrative.
Traditional conceptions of the philosophy of religion can be seen to be the chief way in which religion and philosophy are discussed in concert to examine the meaning and nature of religion.[5] This kind of thinking has its root in Greek thinking, particularly Aristotelian thought. In such works as Metaphysics for example, Aristotle proposes the logical necessity of the existence of a deity and similar arguments can be found in preceding Greek philosophy.[6] And in fact, many are critical of attempts to utilise this era of thought in an attempt to supplement concepts of Catholic theology. One example of this is the rather clumsy move of using Plato’s “Demiurge” God to reinforce the notion of Creation ex Nihlo (creation from nothing), which as Jowett critically remarks, is a result of intellectual Neoplatonist ’absurdities’.[7]
Similar discordant unifications of philosophy and religion are to be found in Aquinas’ use of Aristotelian work. It is important to understand that unlike the later Abrahamic God of Monotheism Aristotle’s God of Philosophy is a calculative postulate of logic and empiricism, rather than any kind of faith or discernible religiosity. Aristotle’s deist deity is even so abstract to be described as Thought Thinking Itself due to its requisite nature as pure actuality.[8] In fact this thought is perhaps best anachronistically understood better as a kind of proto-science than ‘in any sort of religious sense’.[9] This of course makes its use in Catholic theology all the more questionable.[10] As Heidegger reminds us ‘man can neither pray nor sacrifice to this god’.[11] Aquinas’ attempts to supplement his theological understanding of Catholicism with the formal arguments of the philosophy of antiquity is therefore a move many have since criticised. It can be seen as an amalgamative discourse, detrimental to the continuity of both disciplines and their foundational roots.
Even Aquinas himself, while producing the famous Teleological and Cosmological arguments for God’s existence, seemed to note the disconnect between the revelatory, experiential nature of his own faith and the calculative reasoning of philosophy. This is perhaps best exemplified in his comment that ‘everything that I have written seems like straw in comparison to what has been revealed and shown to me’.[12] It is also worth noting that Aquinas, (and most other people of faith for that matter), did not require such arguments and reasoning to explain or support their pre-existing staunch faith.[13] Indeed, the great arguments were typically attempts by Christians to reinforce their faith, so are probably best viewed in a largely religious context rather than as true philosophy, (albiet philosophical Christianity). Anslem for instance wrote his Ontological Argument, taken as a logical proof of God, in the form of a prayer in Proslogian; testimony to the strange and paradoxical nature of unnecessarily “proving God”. Often it is simply the case that ways of life often congeal into propositions – but it is the experiential consequence of believing them that truly matters to believers. It is only after these rituals and values are adopted that they are subsequently justified through propositions. Davies notes that Anselm himself did not need his ontological “proof” for God and only created it to ‘describe what the Christian already believes’.[14]
One way of showing this to be invalid is to point out that the philosophy of religion is conceptually distinct from theology. This is apparent because ‘its critical reflections are based on religious convictions’ and ‘theology is responsible to an authority that initiates its thinking, speaking, and witnessing’.[15] Essentially therefore, the philosophy of religion goes beyond theological thinking in questioning fundamental elements rather than starting from premises such as “God existence”; and this simply isn’t the way in which faith operates.[16] Analytic philosophy simply cannot understand faith on an experiential level and if religion links coherently with philosophy anywhere it is in the thinking of continental existentialism.[17] To this effect, we must turn to Søren Kierkegaard for a more truthful account of philosophy on religion.
Kierkegaard’s take on the philosophy of religion seems to defend the ideational purity of both philosophy and religion, arguing that the analytical take on faith, typified through Christendom has led to a crisis in religious existentialism. That is, faith has become an abstract and propositional notion rather than a practice or engaging way of life as it should be.[18] In his Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard even idolises the staunch dogma of Abraham who ‘is ‘beyond the scope of justification’, fully realising the implications of his faith and living them, realising that they cannot be intellectually defended in the manner that theologians have attempted to. [19] As such, being a fideist, Kierkegaard maintains that religious faith does not need rational justification or the support of rational arguments.[20] So, religion is therefore more of a sentiment than proposition and philosophy can only ever converse in religion to reflect this. If religion can be in any way made compatible with the discourses of philosophy it is through the more continental and experiential branches of the discipline.
It is worth examining the atheist-theist debate in modernity to evidence this narrative further. As many have pointed out, the debate seems to consist of ‘increasingly tired, and tiring, arguments’ which bear little fruit or have any practical effect.[21] Many are also attempting, or at least recognising the meretricious nature in abandoning more barbed approaches which have historically focused on logical argumentation, propositions, and scientific claims.[22] The only inclusions to this conversation that seem to muster any real effect are the more empathetic and existential ones which engage with the ethical dimensions of faith, rather than dismantling metaphysics.[23] This seems to support the account that there is a language problem, of a syncretic nature in that interlocutors are arguing past one another believing that religion concerns analytic philosophy in any meaningful way. [24] Indeed, modern writers have also seemingly come to this conclusion and have begun to transcend the classic “God debate” and question whether ‘reason plays any significant role in the life of the religious believer’.[25] Arthur Bradley identifies that insistence on literalism is a fairly novel phenomenon, principally believed only by the most recent wave of atheists. He argues it is characterised by ‘a-historical and de-contextualized reading of the Bible and the Qur’an alone, insist[ing] upon the literal falsity of Genesis’, etc.[26]
If Kierkegaard’s thought on religion as existentialism over proposition is true, then this would explain the current state of affairs and would account for an increasingly deleterious and inaccurate understanding of religion ‘as a hypothesis’.[27] It would seem apparent that philosophy should subsequently not be concerned with religion, and certainly cannot unhinge or underpin its ideas in any valid sense (to the religious at least) with the exception of Kierkegaard’s very narrow commentary in which he successfully combines the two in a satisfactory and accurate narrative.
When examining Eastern thought however we find this narrative to be slightly weaker. When considering the philosophy inherent within Eastern religiosity, it is unavoidable to discuss Buddhism as perhaps the most demonstrable example of philosophical religiosity. The enquiries of the Buddha and the philosopher Socrates for example are often compared for the similitude of existential questions they raise.[28] In Theravāda Buddhism for instance these questions of ethics and being are often fairly decontextualised from any specific metaphysical elements that may be present (at least more so than in other “Wold Religions”); here the focus is more on engaging with experience than on cosmology and the divine. Some even go as far as to dispute Buddhism’s typology as a religion entirely, arguing the case that Buddhism is the most philosophical of all religions – perhaps even to the point where its classification as a religion is simply inaccurate.[29] Of course, challenging Buddhism’s religious classification brings various difficulties regarding insider/outsider perspectives as most Buddhists seemingly recognise their apparent religious affiliation. In any event, as a religion which carries conceptual difficulties it can be argued the blurring between religion and philosophy is seen here most obviously.
Regardless of how one feels about Buddhism’s status as a religion we also see the same in other Eastern faiths, one specific example being the collection of rituals and practices scholars of the 19th century chose to call Hinduism.[30] Besides its philosophy of language (as Klostermaier remarks) one crucial example of Hindu philosophy is the practice of Yoga.[31] In attempts to engage with ‘existential anxiety’ caused by Avidyā (misunderstanding) of Ātman (the eternal soul) Hinduism redefines notions of being and self through the practice of Yoga.[32] Thus there is a considerable amount of philosophical engagement within the Vedic tradition of Hinduism, perhaps more so than we find in European crossovers of religion and philosophy.[33]
Essentially there must be an endeavour to attempt a distinction of the two concepts at some basic level if we are to make helpful uses of these extant terms and thus render conversation meaningful.[34] Depending on how one defines both, it can be argued that there is a strong enough conceptual difference not to do this however. For instance, though Socrates may ponder the same questions as the Buddha it is ultimately his answers which are the ‘exact opposite’ that defines the contrast of both concepts.[35] The sociology of both is also substantially different enough to distinguish the two and though flirting with ethical and ontological considerations, a theological tome will seldom truly consider questioning God’s existence. Even with these factors considered, we still come precariously close to dismantling our conceptions but the sociological impact, nature and method of religious answers in contradistinction to philosophical ones and the infallibility of faith largely save our definitions without too much revision. It is only after serious consideration we can say this with any conviction.
So, it is not entirely the case that philosophy outright can never comment on religion (or indeed conversely that religion cannot be philosophical) but at the very least the traditional philosophy of religion as a discourse makes very little meaningful sense. More existential branches of philosophy seem to engage more richly and validly in the fullness of religion and here the link between the two is the most intimate, yet, arguably this still does not blend the two entirely. Eastern religions evidence this much more strongly.[36] Depending on one’s definition of religion the case can be made that these conceptual distinctions hold true.[37] One thing is particularly certain, and that is that Western rationalist philosophy cannot successfully and therefore should not engage with or reinforce faith-based claims on its own terms alone.
[1] Thomas Nagel, What Does It All Mean?: A Very Short Introduction to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) p. 5-6
[2] David Cheetham and Rolfe King, Contemporary Practice and Method in the Philosophy of Religion: New Essays (London: A&C Black, 2008) p. 17
[3] By which is meant a rational western typology of philosophy exemplified by critical discussion, rational argument and existentialism under the context of autonomy, agency and free-enquiry.
[4] I would generally define religion in a sociological or psychological sense, concerning power – being the servitude to some greater or higher authority other than humanity’s own moral agency (choice, justification, autonomy, responsibility & reason) and that this figure (or figures) are transcendent and infallible, being apparently a greater being; though not necessarily in a metaphysically divine sense. In this manner, I would argue dialectical materialism to be a kind of religion and many forms of Buddhism and existential spirituality as much less so. Though this is just one, arguably broad take on religion.
[5] As a branch of philosophy this is done in a philosophical framing however, being objective and external to the framework of religion. Meaning that religious thought takes certain premises to be incontestably true within its framework, such as “God exists”. That is, theology examines what it means to be religious from a religious perspective.
[6] Notably here is the idea of Plato’s “Demiurge” in Timaeus. Indeed, even Plato’s Demiurge is a being of little more than necessity and abstraction in comparison to the later God of religion. The Demiurge is often described as simply a teleological cause for the harmony and reason in the universe produced from attempts to explain its order and symmetry. (It is worth noting that Aristotle does not even attribute this causality and order to the divine and simply recognises it as an inherent natural law, even more removed from religious notions). Though Plato’s notion of God does infer some meaning in relation to authority and morality it is also a cosmological text and contrasts to the interpersonal, relational and anthropomorphic deity of monotheism.
Roy Jackson, Plato: A Complete Introduction (Croydon: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd, 2016) p. 198
[7] Plato, Edited by B. Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato: Volume III (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1968) p. 631
[8] If Aristotle’s God could think on a more relatable level of cognitive deliberation it would require a preceding cause of motion to act upon it.
Lloyd P. Gerson, Aristotle and Other Platonists (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2006) p. 200
[9] Richard DeWitt, Worldviews: An Introduction to the History and Philosophy of Science (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2011) p. 110
[10] Aristotle’s “Prime Mover” is little more than a piece of reasoning conjured to explain the movement of the cosmos; principally the natural laws of substance, causality and actuality/potentiality.
[11] Ted Sadler, Heidegger and Aristotle: The Question of Being (London: A&C Black, 2000) p. 175
[12] St. Thomas Aquinas in Simon Tugwell, Albert & Thomas: Selected Writings (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1988) p. 266
[13] God, for Aristotle, is the conclusion of his argument; for Aquinas, it is the premise.
[14] Brian Davies, Aquinas's Summa Theologiae: Critical Essays (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006) p. 40
[15] Helmut Thielicke and Andrew Louth, Encyclopædia Britannica, Theology, 19 August 2009, https://www.britannica.com/topic/theology [Accessed 15 November 2016]
[16] As such, the philosophy of religion seems to examine faith in a way only the faithless could.
[17] Concerned more chiefly with interpretative (sometimes phenomenological) social constructions of truth rather than pure analytical logic. That is, a position embracing and engaging with the experiential nature of reality that some might be tempted to call “postmodernist”.
[18] Reidar Thomte, Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion (Oregon: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2009) p. 217
[19] J. Aaron Simmons and David Wood, Kierkegaard and Levinas: Ethics, Politics, and Religion (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2008) p. 49
[20] In fact, for Kierkegaard, attempting to prove one’s religious faith may even be an indication of a lack of faith.
[21] David Webster, Dispirited: How Contemporary Spirituality Makes Us Stupid Selfish and Unhappy (Zero Books: Winchester, 2012) p. 6
[22] Julian Baggini, Atheism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press: New York, 2003) p. 106
Sophie Elmhirst, The Guardian, Is Richard Dawkins Destroying His Reputation?, 9 April 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/jun/09/is-richard-dawkins-destroying-his-reputation [Accessed 20 April 2016]
[23] Chris Stedman’s work Fathiest is such an example which seeks to establish common ground with religion and a positively defined, ethical atheism.
Chris Stedman, Fathiest, The Book, http://faitheistbook.com/ [Accessed 10 November 2016]
[24] Webster, Dispirited, The Circle of Stupid.., 8 August 2015, https://dispirited.org/2015/08/08/the-circle-of-stupid/ [Accessed 15 November 2016]
That is, rituals and practices are not always passed as objective statements, at least not to in the minds of religion’s adherents. These ways of life often congeal into propositions as mentioned previously.
[25] Kelly James Clark, The Internet Encyclopaedia, Religious Epistemology: Groundless Believing, http://www.iep.utm.edu/relig-ep/ [Accessed 17 April 2016]
[26] Arthur Bradley, The New Atheist Novel: Fiction, Philosophy and Polemic After 9/11 (Edinburgh: A&C Black, 2010) p. 5
[27] Ryan C. Falconi in Amarnath Amarasingam, Religion and the New Atheism: A Critical Appraisal (Netherlands; BRILL, 2010) p. 203
[28] Pravrajika Vivekaprana, A Challenge for Modern Minds (Fort Lauderdale: Llumina Press, 2002) p. 21-22
Stephen J. Laumakis, An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) p. 126
[29] William Herbrechtsmeier, ‘Buddhism and the definition of religion: One more time’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 32 (1993) 1-17
Sam Harris, Killing the Buddha, Lion’s Roar, 1 March 2006, http://www.lionsroar.com/killing-the-buddha/ [Accessed 20 February 2015]
[30] While discussing Eastern faiths we have to be mindful of notions such as Christocentricism, eurocentrism and other colonial projections which have ultimately impacted the academically clumsy narratives we have projected onto the Eastern world. That is, our incommensurable notions taken from western understanding of monotheism cannot hope to holistically capture the essence of beliefs and practices elsewhere.
[31] Klaus K. Klostermaier, A Survey of Hinduism: Third Edition (New York: SUNY Press, 2007) p. 69
[32] Michael Stone, The Inner Tradition of Yoga: A Guide to Yoga Philosophy for the Contemporary Practitioner (Boulder City: Shambhala Publications, 2008) p. 70
[33] Not only by wholly redefining questions of being and self with a seemingly richer and further existential note that is found in Western tradition but also recognising the experiential nature of this engagement beyond analytical logic.
[34] The alternative is to simply abandon them as academically outdated and inaccurate notions.
[35] Pietro Archiati, The Great Religions: Pathways to Our Innermost Being (Forest Row: Temple Lodge Publishing, 1998) p. 26
[36] Not only by wholly redefining questions of being and self with a richer existential note that is found in Western tradition but also recognising the experiential nature of this engagement beyond analytical logic.
[37] The definition given in this piece is arguably considerably loose.
Many who have criticised the intellectual blending of these two discourses stand from varied viewpoints of both religiosity and the philosophical tradition. These critics often advocate that the essence of religion is essentially opposed to notions of, at the very least, traditional thought in philosophy.[3] There is a strong case to be made here whereby examination of the Western discourse known as the “philosophy of religion” can demonstrably be shown to be largely invalid. This is palpable throughout history, exemplified by the syncretic blurring of Aristotelian metaphysics and Catholic theology from thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas, criticised by both the faithful and philosophical. It is also particularly true when one glances at the state of debate in modernity as dialogues continue to bear little fruit under the guise of the ilk of Richard Dawkins, who to the annoyance of atheists and theists alike, abortively challenges the rationality of countless believers.
Thus, though there is no doubt a rich and intimate relationship of engagement between the two, philosophy and religion do appear to be linked albeit distinct concepts, often principally converse. However, when we expand this narrative to encompass Eastern thought we find it sits much less comfortably. Moving beyond traditional and academically comfortable notions of both religion and philosophy we begin to see that this narrative, which is largely applicable in the traditions of Western thought, is a much more difficult exaction here.[4] In fact, when the existentialism of Buddhist and even the (perhaps) less obvious example of Hindu thinking are consulted, the conceptual blurring may even be good cause to consider an alternative narrative.
Traditional conceptions of the philosophy of religion can be seen to be the chief way in which religion and philosophy are discussed in concert to examine the meaning and nature of religion.[5] This kind of thinking has its root in Greek thinking, particularly Aristotelian thought. In such works as Metaphysics for example, Aristotle proposes the logical necessity of the existence of a deity and similar arguments can be found in preceding Greek philosophy.[6] And in fact, many are critical of attempts to utilise this era of thought in an attempt to supplement concepts of Catholic theology. One example of this is the rather clumsy move of using Plato’s “Demiurge” God to reinforce the notion of Creation ex Nihlo (creation from nothing), which as Jowett critically remarks, is a result of intellectual Neoplatonist ’absurdities’.[7]
Similar discordant unifications of philosophy and religion are to be found in Aquinas’ use of Aristotelian work. It is important to understand that unlike the later Abrahamic God of Monotheism Aristotle’s God of Philosophy is a calculative postulate of logic and empiricism, rather than any kind of faith or discernible religiosity. Aristotle’s deist deity is even so abstract to be described as Thought Thinking Itself due to its requisite nature as pure actuality.[8] In fact this thought is perhaps best anachronistically understood better as a kind of proto-science than ‘in any sort of religious sense’.[9] This of course makes its use in Catholic theology all the more questionable.[10] As Heidegger reminds us ‘man can neither pray nor sacrifice to this god’.[11] Aquinas’ attempts to supplement his theological understanding of Catholicism with the formal arguments of the philosophy of antiquity is therefore a move many have since criticised. It can be seen as an amalgamative discourse, detrimental to the continuity of both disciplines and their foundational roots.
Even Aquinas himself, while producing the famous Teleological and Cosmological arguments for God’s existence, seemed to note the disconnect between the revelatory, experiential nature of his own faith and the calculative reasoning of philosophy. This is perhaps best exemplified in his comment that ‘everything that I have written seems like straw in comparison to what has been revealed and shown to me’.[12] It is also worth noting that Aquinas, (and most other people of faith for that matter), did not require such arguments and reasoning to explain or support their pre-existing staunch faith.[13] Indeed, the great arguments were typically attempts by Christians to reinforce their faith, so are probably best viewed in a largely religious context rather than as true philosophy, (albiet philosophical Christianity). Anslem for instance wrote his Ontological Argument, taken as a logical proof of God, in the form of a prayer in Proslogian; testimony to the strange and paradoxical nature of unnecessarily “proving God”. Often it is simply the case that ways of life often congeal into propositions – but it is the experiential consequence of believing them that truly matters to believers. It is only after these rituals and values are adopted that they are subsequently justified through propositions. Davies notes that Anselm himself did not need his ontological “proof” for God and only created it to ‘describe what the Christian already believes’.[14]
One way of showing this to be invalid is to point out that the philosophy of religion is conceptually distinct from theology. This is apparent because ‘its critical reflections are based on religious convictions’ and ‘theology is responsible to an authority that initiates its thinking, speaking, and witnessing’.[15] Essentially therefore, the philosophy of religion goes beyond theological thinking in questioning fundamental elements rather than starting from premises such as “God existence”; and this simply isn’t the way in which faith operates.[16] Analytic philosophy simply cannot understand faith on an experiential level and if religion links coherently with philosophy anywhere it is in the thinking of continental existentialism.[17] To this effect, we must turn to Søren Kierkegaard for a more truthful account of philosophy on religion.
Kierkegaard’s take on the philosophy of religion seems to defend the ideational purity of both philosophy and religion, arguing that the analytical take on faith, typified through Christendom has led to a crisis in religious existentialism. That is, faith has become an abstract and propositional notion rather than a practice or engaging way of life as it should be.[18] In his Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard even idolises the staunch dogma of Abraham who ‘is ‘beyond the scope of justification’, fully realising the implications of his faith and living them, realising that they cannot be intellectually defended in the manner that theologians have attempted to. [19] As such, being a fideist, Kierkegaard maintains that religious faith does not need rational justification or the support of rational arguments.[20] So, religion is therefore more of a sentiment than proposition and philosophy can only ever converse in religion to reflect this. If religion can be in any way made compatible with the discourses of philosophy it is through the more continental and experiential branches of the discipline.
It is worth examining the atheist-theist debate in modernity to evidence this narrative further. As many have pointed out, the debate seems to consist of ‘increasingly tired, and tiring, arguments’ which bear little fruit or have any practical effect.[21] Many are also attempting, or at least recognising the meretricious nature in abandoning more barbed approaches which have historically focused on logical argumentation, propositions, and scientific claims.[22] The only inclusions to this conversation that seem to muster any real effect are the more empathetic and existential ones which engage with the ethical dimensions of faith, rather than dismantling metaphysics.[23] This seems to support the account that there is a language problem, of a syncretic nature in that interlocutors are arguing past one another believing that religion concerns analytic philosophy in any meaningful way. [24] Indeed, modern writers have also seemingly come to this conclusion and have begun to transcend the classic “God debate” and question whether ‘reason plays any significant role in the life of the religious believer’.[25] Arthur Bradley identifies that insistence on literalism is a fairly novel phenomenon, principally believed only by the most recent wave of atheists. He argues it is characterised by ‘a-historical and de-contextualized reading of the Bible and the Qur’an alone, insist[ing] upon the literal falsity of Genesis’, etc.[26]
If Kierkegaard’s thought on religion as existentialism over proposition is true, then this would explain the current state of affairs and would account for an increasingly deleterious and inaccurate understanding of religion ‘as a hypothesis’.[27] It would seem apparent that philosophy should subsequently not be concerned with religion, and certainly cannot unhinge or underpin its ideas in any valid sense (to the religious at least) with the exception of Kierkegaard’s very narrow commentary in which he successfully combines the two in a satisfactory and accurate narrative.
When examining Eastern thought however we find this narrative to be slightly weaker. When considering the philosophy inherent within Eastern religiosity, it is unavoidable to discuss Buddhism as perhaps the most demonstrable example of philosophical religiosity. The enquiries of the Buddha and the philosopher Socrates for example are often compared for the similitude of existential questions they raise.[28] In Theravāda Buddhism for instance these questions of ethics and being are often fairly decontextualised from any specific metaphysical elements that may be present (at least more so than in other “Wold Religions”); here the focus is more on engaging with experience than on cosmology and the divine. Some even go as far as to dispute Buddhism’s typology as a religion entirely, arguing the case that Buddhism is the most philosophical of all religions – perhaps even to the point where its classification as a religion is simply inaccurate.[29] Of course, challenging Buddhism’s religious classification brings various difficulties regarding insider/outsider perspectives as most Buddhists seemingly recognise their apparent religious affiliation. In any event, as a religion which carries conceptual difficulties it can be argued the blurring between religion and philosophy is seen here most obviously.
Regardless of how one feels about Buddhism’s status as a religion we also see the same in other Eastern faiths, one specific example being the collection of rituals and practices scholars of the 19th century chose to call Hinduism.[30] Besides its philosophy of language (as Klostermaier remarks) one crucial example of Hindu philosophy is the practice of Yoga.[31] In attempts to engage with ‘existential anxiety’ caused by Avidyā (misunderstanding) of Ātman (the eternal soul) Hinduism redefines notions of being and self through the practice of Yoga.[32] Thus there is a considerable amount of philosophical engagement within the Vedic tradition of Hinduism, perhaps more so than we find in European crossovers of religion and philosophy.[33]
Essentially there must be an endeavour to attempt a distinction of the two concepts at some basic level if we are to make helpful uses of these extant terms and thus render conversation meaningful.[34] Depending on how one defines both, it can be argued that there is a strong enough conceptual difference not to do this however. For instance, though Socrates may ponder the same questions as the Buddha it is ultimately his answers which are the ‘exact opposite’ that defines the contrast of both concepts.[35] The sociology of both is also substantially different enough to distinguish the two and though flirting with ethical and ontological considerations, a theological tome will seldom truly consider questioning God’s existence. Even with these factors considered, we still come precariously close to dismantling our conceptions but the sociological impact, nature and method of religious answers in contradistinction to philosophical ones and the infallibility of faith largely save our definitions without too much revision. It is only after serious consideration we can say this with any conviction.
So, it is not entirely the case that philosophy outright can never comment on religion (or indeed conversely that religion cannot be philosophical) but at the very least the traditional philosophy of religion as a discourse makes very little meaningful sense. More existential branches of philosophy seem to engage more richly and validly in the fullness of religion and here the link between the two is the most intimate, yet, arguably this still does not blend the two entirely. Eastern religions evidence this much more strongly.[36] Depending on one’s definition of religion the case can be made that these conceptual distinctions hold true.[37] One thing is particularly certain, and that is that Western rationalist philosophy cannot successfully and therefore should not engage with or reinforce faith-based claims on its own terms alone.
[1] Thomas Nagel, What Does It All Mean?: A Very Short Introduction to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) p. 5-6
[2] David Cheetham and Rolfe King, Contemporary Practice and Method in the Philosophy of Religion: New Essays (London: A&C Black, 2008) p. 17
[3] By which is meant a rational western typology of philosophy exemplified by critical discussion, rational argument and existentialism under the context of autonomy, agency and free-enquiry.
[4] I would generally define religion in a sociological or psychological sense, concerning power – being the servitude to some greater or higher authority other than humanity’s own moral agency (choice, justification, autonomy, responsibility & reason) and that this figure (or figures) are transcendent and infallible, being apparently a greater being; though not necessarily in a metaphysically divine sense. In this manner, I would argue dialectical materialism to be a kind of religion and many forms of Buddhism and existential spirituality as much less so. Though this is just one, arguably broad take on religion.
[5] As a branch of philosophy this is done in a philosophical framing however, being objective and external to the framework of religion. Meaning that religious thought takes certain premises to be incontestably true within its framework, such as “God exists”. That is, theology examines what it means to be religious from a religious perspective.
[6] Notably here is the idea of Plato’s “Demiurge” in Timaeus. Indeed, even Plato’s Demiurge is a being of little more than necessity and abstraction in comparison to the later God of religion. The Demiurge is often described as simply a teleological cause for the harmony and reason in the universe produced from attempts to explain its order and symmetry. (It is worth noting that Aristotle does not even attribute this causality and order to the divine and simply recognises it as an inherent natural law, even more removed from religious notions). Though Plato’s notion of God does infer some meaning in relation to authority and morality it is also a cosmological text and contrasts to the interpersonal, relational and anthropomorphic deity of monotheism.
Roy Jackson, Plato: A Complete Introduction (Croydon: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd, 2016) p. 198
[7] Plato, Edited by B. Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato: Volume III (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1968) p. 631
[8] If Aristotle’s God could think on a more relatable level of cognitive deliberation it would require a preceding cause of motion to act upon it.
Lloyd P. Gerson, Aristotle and Other Platonists (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2006) p. 200
[9] Richard DeWitt, Worldviews: An Introduction to the History and Philosophy of Science (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2011) p. 110
[10] Aristotle’s “Prime Mover” is little more than a piece of reasoning conjured to explain the movement of the cosmos; principally the natural laws of substance, causality and actuality/potentiality.
[11] Ted Sadler, Heidegger and Aristotle: The Question of Being (London: A&C Black, 2000) p. 175
[12] St. Thomas Aquinas in Simon Tugwell, Albert & Thomas: Selected Writings (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1988) p. 266
[13] God, for Aristotle, is the conclusion of his argument; for Aquinas, it is the premise.
[14] Brian Davies, Aquinas's Summa Theologiae: Critical Essays (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006) p. 40
[15] Helmut Thielicke and Andrew Louth, Encyclopædia Britannica, Theology, 19 August 2009, https://www.britannica.com/topic/theology [Accessed 15 November 2016]
[16] As such, the philosophy of religion seems to examine faith in a way only the faithless could.
[17] Concerned more chiefly with interpretative (sometimes phenomenological) social constructions of truth rather than pure analytical logic. That is, a position embracing and engaging with the experiential nature of reality that some might be tempted to call “postmodernist”.
[18] Reidar Thomte, Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion (Oregon: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2009) p. 217
[19] J. Aaron Simmons and David Wood, Kierkegaard and Levinas: Ethics, Politics, and Religion (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2008) p. 49
[20] In fact, for Kierkegaard, attempting to prove one’s religious faith may even be an indication of a lack of faith.
[21] David Webster, Dispirited: How Contemporary Spirituality Makes Us Stupid Selfish and Unhappy (Zero Books: Winchester, 2012) p. 6
[22] Julian Baggini, Atheism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press: New York, 2003) p. 106
Sophie Elmhirst, The Guardian, Is Richard Dawkins Destroying His Reputation?, 9 April 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/jun/09/is-richard-dawkins-destroying-his-reputation [Accessed 20 April 2016]
[23] Chris Stedman’s work Fathiest is such an example which seeks to establish common ground with religion and a positively defined, ethical atheism.
Chris Stedman, Fathiest, The Book, http://faitheistbook.com/ [Accessed 10 November 2016]
[24] Webster, Dispirited, The Circle of Stupid.., 8 August 2015, https://dispirited.org/2015/08/08/the-circle-of-stupid/ [Accessed 15 November 2016]
That is, rituals and practices are not always passed as objective statements, at least not to in the minds of religion’s adherents. These ways of life often congeal into propositions as mentioned previously.
[25] Kelly James Clark, The Internet Encyclopaedia, Religious Epistemology: Groundless Believing, http://www.iep.utm.edu/relig-ep/ [Accessed 17 April 2016]
[26] Arthur Bradley, The New Atheist Novel: Fiction, Philosophy and Polemic After 9/11 (Edinburgh: A&C Black, 2010) p. 5
[27] Ryan C. Falconi in Amarnath Amarasingam, Religion and the New Atheism: A Critical Appraisal (Netherlands; BRILL, 2010) p. 203
[28] Pravrajika Vivekaprana, A Challenge for Modern Minds (Fort Lauderdale: Llumina Press, 2002) p. 21-22
Stephen J. Laumakis, An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) p. 126
[29] William Herbrechtsmeier, ‘Buddhism and the definition of religion: One more time’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 32 (1993) 1-17
Sam Harris, Killing the Buddha, Lion’s Roar, 1 March 2006, http://www.lionsroar.com/killing-the-buddha/ [Accessed 20 February 2015]
[30] While discussing Eastern faiths we have to be mindful of notions such as Christocentricism, eurocentrism and other colonial projections which have ultimately impacted the academically clumsy narratives we have projected onto the Eastern world. That is, our incommensurable notions taken from western understanding of monotheism cannot hope to holistically capture the essence of beliefs and practices elsewhere.
[31] Klaus K. Klostermaier, A Survey of Hinduism: Third Edition (New York: SUNY Press, 2007) p. 69
[32] Michael Stone, The Inner Tradition of Yoga: A Guide to Yoga Philosophy for the Contemporary Practitioner (Boulder City: Shambhala Publications, 2008) p. 70
[33] Not only by wholly redefining questions of being and self with a seemingly richer and further existential note that is found in Western tradition but also recognising the experiential nature of this engagement beyond analytical logic.
[34] The alternative is to simply abandon them as academically outdated and inaccurate notions.
[35] Pietro Archiati, The Great Religions: Pathways to Our Innermost Being (Forest Row: Temple Lodge Publishing, 1998) p. 26
[36] Not only by wholly redefining questions of being and self with a richer existential note that is found in Western tradition but also recognising the experiential nature of this engagement beyond analytical logic.
[37] The definition given in this piece is arguably considerably loose.